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ESSAYS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMICS
Jipeng Zhang, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
In this dissertation, we develop empirical methods, built on the recent advances in industrial
organization, to study charitable giving and fundraising in the charity market. In the first
essay (joint with Holger Sieg), we propose a multiple discrete choice model with differenti-
ated charitable products and estimate the model using a unique data set of donor lists for the
ten largest charitable organizations in Pittsburgh. We find that some private benefits such
as invitations to private dinner parties and special events are effective tools for fundraising.
Our policy simulations suggest that the composition of private benefits has a potentially
large impact on donor behavior. In the second essay, I investigate the determinants of dona-
tions to charitable organizations by incorporating their managerial capacity and fundraising
productivity. Using data from environmental charities, I find that managerial capacity has a
significantly positive impact on raising donations, which demonstrates the long-run benefits
of managerial expenses. Fundraising productivity is a charity-specific and serially-correlated
unobserved variable that causes an endogeneity problem in the estimation of the donation
function. After controlling for the fundraising productivity, the estimated impact from man-
agerial capacity on donations is significantly increased, while the impact from fundraising
expenditure is significantly decreased. Finally, after estimating the donation function, I con-
struct a measure of fundraising productivity and show that it is a key factor in explaining
the variation of donations, suggesting that policy discussions should account for charities’
differences in fundraising productivity and the causes of such differences.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In this dissertation, we study the different aspects of the charity market: charitable giv-
ing, fundraising efficiency, and the impact of government grants on donations to charities.
Methodologically, we introduce the analytical tools recently developed in the literature of in-
dustrial organization into the economics of charities. In doing so, we contribute new findings
and insights to the existing literature.
Private donations are an important source of revenue for most charitable organizations.
Consequently, most charitable organizations need effective fundraising strategies to provide
continued public services. While some individuals may support their favorite charities re-
gardless of the incentive structures used to attract donors, others may be motivated to give
conditional on the benefits the organization offers. The former set of donors might be pure
altruistic or gain satisfaction from knowing that they contributed to a worthy cause–called
“warm-glow” or impure altruistic, whereas these latter donors fit into the notion that donors
receive tangible or intangible private benefits from their gifts. To attract the more fickle
donors, charitable organizations rely on sophisticated fundraising strategies. The more gen-
erous the donation, the more lavish the private benefit package.
In the first essay (joint with Holger Sieg), we study donors motives for giving, especially
whether and which private benefits are valued by donors. After identifying donors’ motives
of giving, we can quantify donors’ preferences for different charitable causes and conduct
policy experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of different fundraising strategies. We
collected a unique data set which includes donor lists and fundraising schedules from ten
large charitable organizations in Pittsburgh and the social-economic information of these
donors. We develop a multiple choice model by treating different tiers of giving to different
charities as differentiated products; donors make decisions by maximizing their utility from
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giving (or buying charitable products) in multiple periods. We find that private benefits
that furnish social status to donors provide important incentives for donors to support the
related charities. Our policy experiments show that the design of charitable product set and
the schedules of private benefit are effective tools in fundraising.
The second essay examines the other side of the charity market, the determinants of
donations received by charities and their differences in fundraising productivity. Previous
studies of the determination of donations focus on the impact of government grants, also
known as the crowding-out analysis (Andreoni, 2006). I introduce two new elements, man-
agerial capacity and fundraising productivity, into the analysis. This aims to capture the
dynamic impact of overhead expenditures (in fundraising and management) and the het-
erogeneity of charitys efficiency, which are key factors in the process of raising donations.
Incorporating these factors helps to clarify the empirical challenge in estimating the dona-
tion function. That is, fundraising efficiency is unobservable for researchers but known to
charities when they make expenditure decisions, which makes the explanatory variables in
the donation function endogenous. The paper proposes an empirical strategy to resolve this
endogeneity problem using the optimization condition of charitys expenditure which contains
the information of fundraising efficiency, based on Olley and Pakes (1996).
Using the data from green charities, the paper finds that, as predicted, the estimated
impact from fundraising expenditure on donations is reduced significantly, while the impact
from managerial capacity is increased. Investments in management have a significant positive
long-run impact on donations. Finally, I propose a new measure of efficiency, fundraising
productivity, which is an important determinant of donations. In contrast to the commonly
used measurethe ratio between donations and fundraising, fundraising productivity can be
explained by the observed indices of the qualities of charities.
The findings have important implications on the policy discussion. First, if the estimated
impact of fundraising on donations is under-estimated without controlling for productivity,
the indirect crowding-out, that is, the multiplication between the estimate from fundraising
on donations and the estimate from government grants on fundraising, is under-estimated.
Second, government policies aiming to utilize or offset the crowding out effect should take
the differences in charities’ fundraising productivity into consideration.
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2.0 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVATE BENEFITS IN FUNDRAISING
OF LOCAL CHARITIES (JOINT WITH HOLGER SIEG)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Private donations are an important source of revenue for most charitable organizations, par-
ticularly symphonic orchestras, public theaters, and museums. Direct revenues from ticket
sales and other activities rarely cover costs. Consequently, most charitable organizations
need effective fundraising strategies to provide continued levels of service. While some in-
dividuals may support their favorite charities regardless of the incentive structures used to
attract donors, others may be motivated to give conditional on the benefits the organization
offers. The former set of donors gain satisfaction from knowing that they contributed to a
worthy cause (called “warm-glow” by Andreoni (1989, 1990), whereas these latter donors fit
into the framework of Harbaugh (1998) where donors receive tangible or intangible private
benefits from their gifts. To attract the more fickle donors, charitable organizations rely on
sophisticated fundraising strategies. The more generous the donation, the more lavish the
private benefit package. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether and which pri-
vate benefits are valued by donors. Using a sample of large cultural organizations that offer
potential donors a variety of different private benefit packages, we find that exclusive dinner
parties and special exclusive events are effective tools for attracting large annual donations.
The previous literature has set up a dichotomy in which donors are described as motivated
by either warm glow or private benefits. A more compelling approach acknowledges the fact
that most donors are driven by both motivations. The weight an individual donor places
on each motivation depends on personal characteristics. It is, therefore, desirable to design
an empirical approach that nests both hypotheses and allows us to determine the relative
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importance of these different incentives. Using explicit measures of private benefits we test
which type of private benefits explain the observed choice behavior of donors. Our preference
specification also nests the special case in which all donations are driven almost exclusively
by warm-glow.
Our approach differs from previous empirical studies in the charitable donations literature
since we view each organization as a multi-product firm. Each organization offers “core”
products such as concerts, opera performances or museum exhibitions that are closely related
to the mission of the organization. These goods are often standard market goods. In addition,
each organization offers a second set of products that cannot be purchased in the marketplace,
but can be obtained only by donating money to the charity. Thus, by donating money to the
organization, a donor not only obtains warm glow, but may also receive a number of exclusive
private benefits in return for the donation. We focus on the second type of non-market goods
that are offered by large cultural and environmental organizations.
Our modeling approach is rooted in the literature on characteristic models or differenti-
ated products (Gorman, 1980; Lancaster, 1966). We interpret the amount of giving as the
“price” associated with these product bundles. One component of the bundle may be warm
glow. Others are private benefits that can be explicitly measured. We thus assume that each
tier or level of giving to a specific charity can be characterized by a vector of observed and
unobserved attributes.1
To implement our empirical analysis we assemble a novel and extensive data set that
allows us to compare the private benefits offered to donors by charities. The core of the em-
pirical analysis is based on data that we have assembled using publicly available donor lists
of ten large cultural and environmental organizations in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area.
By focusing on a larger number of charitable organizations, we generate 76 different combi-
nations of levels of giving and private benefits in our sample. Holding giving constant, the
variation in private benefits arises because different charitable organizations pursue different
strategies to raise funds and appeal to donors. Organizations like the Opera and Symphony
have much different reward structures than the Zoo or the Children’s Museum. For example,
1Berry (1994) discusses the endogeneity of prices (amount of giving) when unobserved product charac-
teristics are important.
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the Opera and Symphony award explicit private benefits associated with each level of giving,
whereas the Zoo and Children’s Museum do not. This observed variation of private benefits
at constant levels of giving allows us to identify the effects of private benefits.
A key feature of our data set is that a significant number of individuals support multiple
charities. A large number of individuals give to three or more charities. Some individuals
give to nine charities. A simple discrete choice model which assumes individuals donate to a
single charity does not describe our sample well. One could in principle extend the discrete
choice framework to allow consumers to choose among “tuples” of goods. But the relevant
choice set gets intractably large when individuals donate to multiple organizations.
For the same reason, we cannot use a hedonic approach to identify the underlying pref-
erences of households. We can regress the amount of donations required for each tier on
the vector of observed characteristics and thus implement the first stage of a hedonic price
regression. However, to learn more about the underlying household preferences, one would
need to implement the second stage of the hedonic which is challenging as explained by
Epple (1987) and Ekeland, Heckman, and Nesheim (2004). More importantly, the hedonic
approach suffers from similar problems as the pure discrete choice approach. Hedonic models
typically assume that consumers purchase one unit of a differentiated product. Since simple
discrete choice or hedonic approaches are not feasible, we adopt a different approach that
builds on the literature on multiple-discrete choice models.
We follow Hendel’s (1999) pioneering paper and model the observed behavior as a re-
peated discrete choice with multiple choice occasions. In many applications, multiple choice
occasions arise because a number of different agents make simultaneous decisions. In our
model, we have a single decision maker who faces a sequential decision problem. Thus, it
is useful to relax the additive separability assumption in Hendel (1999) and introduce some
state dependence among the choice occasions. In our context, it is plausible that previous
levels of charitable giving affect contemporary behavior. To capture this type of habit for-
mation, we assume that past charitable behavior is a state variable in our dynamic decision
model and has a direct impact on current period utility. Since we do not observe behavior at
each choice occasion, we integrate over all feasible choice sequences to derive a well-specified
likelihood function. Based on this likelihood function, we can estimate fixed effects for each
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tier of giving. In the second stage, we then decompose these fixed effects into parts that can
be explained by observed and unobserved characteristics.2 We thus control for the fact that
unobserved characteristics associated with each tier of giving are correlated with observed
amounts of giving. Adopting a differentiated product approach is central to identifying and
estimating the role that private benefits play in explaining donations.
Our theory-based estimation approach has many advantages over simpler approaches.
Simple reduced form approaches such as hedonic price regressions typically do not allow
researchers to identify the underlying preferences of households. Our findings provide some
important new insights in the quantitative importance of private benefits in fundraising.
Households value private benefits that are affiliated with high social prestige such as invita-
tions to dinner parties and special events. Small token gifts and extra tickets are not valued
by most individuals. Members of the board of a charity or households that also support
the United Way give substantially higher amounts than other donors. Individuals with high
levels of wealth or those that support political candidates are more likely to make large
donations and place a higher value on the private benefits associated with social functions.
Our approach also allows us to evaluate non-marginal policy changes that cannot be
evaluated with simpler approaches. Our policy experiments indicate that charities have
strong incentives to redesign private benefit schedules to increase donations. We also consider
the scenario in which charities stop using private incentives. Our model shows that charities
that heavily rely on special events and dinners to attract wealthy donors would receive
much lower donations. We then decompose the total amount of giving into a warm-glow
component and a component that is due to private benefits. These types of decompositions
are outside the scope of reduced form or simple experimental estimators that estimate local
average treatment effects. We find that the fraction of donations that can be attributed to
warm-glow varies substantially among the charities considered in the application.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper discusses the data
set. Section 3 provides a formal model that can be used to analyze individual donations to
multiple charities. Section 4 develops a new estimator for this class of models. This estimator
2Our estimation approach thus combines micro level data with aggregate data and is similar in spirit to
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (2004).
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combines previous work on dynamic discrete choice estimation and multiple discrete choice
estimators. Section 5 reports the results from this estimation exercise and discusses the fit of
the model. Section 6 explores the policy implications of our results. Conclusions are offered
in Section 7.
2.2 DATA
In this section we discuss our sample and present some descriptive statistics. We document
the importance of giving to multiple organization. This discussion motivates the use of
a multiple discrete choice model. Finally, we document the prevalence and importance of
private benefits. This evidence suggests to treat donations as bundles of goods with different
characteristics.
2.2.1 The Sample and Descriptive Statistics
We have assembled our data set from a number of publicly available sources. We use an-
nual reports, playbills, and programs for ten large Pittsburgh cultural and environmental
organizations. These are the Pittsburgh Ballet Theater, Carnegie Museums of Pittsburgh,
Pittsburgh Children’s Museum, City Theater, Pittsburgh Opera, Phipps Conservatory, Pitts-
burgh Public Theater, Pittsburgh Symphony, Western Pennsylvania Conservancy, and Pitts-
burgh Zoo & PPG Aquarium. The sample is representative and includes all the large orga-
nizations in the Pittsburgh market. The donor lists are from the 2004-2005 donation cycle.
We thus have cross-sectional data for one year.
For individual characteristics on our donors, we use data from the Allegheny County
Real Estate database, socio-demographic information from the U.S. Census, and political
contribution data from the Federal Election Commission database. For professional mem-
berships, we use lists from the Allegheny County Medical Society (physicians) and the Al-
legheny County Bar Association (attorneys). We merge these five different databases using
an algorithm we describe in detail below.
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The main sample we use is a choice-based sample. We only include individuals in our
sample that are listed in at least one of the donor lists for our ten charitable organizations.
Consequently, the main focus of this paper is on the population of individuals that are
active donors. In the literature of charitable giving, it is common practice to use choice-
based samples. Almost all papers that have estimated the incentive effects of taxes on
charitable giving use tax return data for individuals that itemize deductions. Examples are
Clotfelter (1985), Randolph (1995), or Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002). Choice-based
samples are also commonly used in the empirical literature that has focused on fundraising
and the crowding-out effect of government grants. Kingma (1989) and Manzoor and Straub
(2005) use survey data sets that only cover people who listened to public radio. Buraschi
and Cornelli (2003) use data based on subscription lists from the English National Opera.
Other studies have relied on aggregate data. Ribar and Wilhelm, (2002) estimate their model
using a 1986-92 panel of donations and government funding from the United States to 125
international relief and development organizations. Hungermann (2005) uses a new panel
data set of Presbyterian Church congregations.
To evaluate the impact of choice based sampling, we have also created a random sample
of 10,000 households in Allegheny County. Those households are matched against the list
of donors. There are only 90 observations that we identify as having contributed to one of
the ten organizations. This implies that less than one percent of households in Allegheny
County contribute to these cultural and environmental organizations. We also find that 0.9
percent of all households are physicians compared to the 6.0 percentin the donor sample.
There are 1.3 percent lawyers in the random sample compared to 7.7 percent in the donor
sample. In the random sample, 147 households (1.5 percent) contributed at least $200 to a
national political cause as reported by the FEC compared to the 11.3 percent of donors in
the choice based sample. Using the random sample, we have estimated a simple logit model
which predicts who will donate to a charitable organization. We find that married couples,
physicians and lawyers, and individuals that donate to either political party are significantly
more likely to donate to one of these organizations. Income, housing values, and years lived
in the house, in contrast, do not seem to be systematically correlated with becoming a donor.
The donor lists do not provide exact gift amounts; instead they identify the range of
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giving associated with each tier. For some calculations in this section we use the lower-
bound on the giving ranges since most individuals tend to give at those lower levels as
reported by Harbaugh (1998) and Glaser and Konrad, (1996). The unit of observation in
this study is a household. There are a total of 6,499 individuals and couples listed in the
programs of the ten organizations and total giving is $6,732,705. The donation data are
summarized in Table 1. We find that the median gift size for all organizations is close to the
lowest tier, suggesting that the majority of donors give in the lowest or second-lowest range
reported by these organizations.
Table 1: Donations by Organization
# of Total Median Average Standard
Donors Donations Deviation
Ballet 559 $399,750 $250 $715.12 $1,069
Carnegie Museums 1,236 $2,303,005 $1,000 $1,863.27 $3,678
Children’s Museum 185 $79,350 $100 $428.92 $1,396
City Theater 170 $185,200 $100 $1,089.41 $638
Opera 556 $1,125,000 $250 $2,023.38 $5,552
Phipps Conservatory 984 $189,200 $100 $192.28 $463
Public Theater 1,082 $410,200 $50 $379.11 $1,019
Symphony 668 $1,361,500 $1,000 $2,038.17 $3,882
WPC 2,082 $523,350 $100 $251.37 $875
Zoo 649 $155,650 $50 $239.83 $531
Only a small fraction of the donors are listed as “anonymous,” suggesting that donors
want to be recognized in official publications.3 Most donors are listed by name in each of
the donor lists. The Allegheny County Real Estate database lists the name of the owners of
a property. The Federal Election Commission maintains a database that lists the names of
donors that support candidates running for federal offices. Finally, we also collected a list
3Appendix A.1 provides a table that list the number of anonymous donors by charity.
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of lawyers that are members of the American Bar Association and a list of members of the
Allegheny County Medical Society. We consolidated the donor lists and matched up names
that appeared to be the same. We wrote a simple Excel program that suggested the most
likely matches for each individual in the sample. We then inspected each case individually
and chose the most likely match by hand. This procedure worked well for the vast majority
of observations in our sample. It proved to be a more challenging task if individuals have
their names listed slightly different in different organizations. Some appeared more formally
printed (Mr. & Mrs. John A. Doe, Jr.), while some appeared more casual (John and Jane
Doe). Matching is most difficult for individuals with extremely common last and first names.
Knowing the names of both spouses can be helpful in that case.
Matching our data to professional lists, we find that 391 physicians and 500 lawyers
gave money to at least one of the ten Pittsburgh cultural organizations. To determine the
housing wealth of donors in our sample, we match the donors to the Allegheny County
Real Estate Assessment website.4 A subset of individuals (54 percent) can be identified as
owning property in Allegheny County.5 The main part of the empirical analysis focuses on
households in Allegheny County that are matched to the real estate data base. We report
descriptive statistics in Table 2 that summarize the distribution of housing values, by charity,
in our sample.
The Carnegie Museums and the Pittsburgh Symphony attract donors with the highest
average housing values. Surprisingly, donors to the Children’s Museum have the third highest
housing wealth. The Western Pennsylvania Conservancy and the City Theater have donors
with lower housing values. The real estate data base contains the address of the house,
which allows us to match each observation in the sample to a Census Block Group and
assign a (neighborhood) income level to each observation. Moreover, we can distinguish
4The site was established to provide transparency to the assessment of property taxes and has every
residential property listed with the deeded owner’s name.
5Observations are lost because donors live outside the Allegheny county. The number of donors in our
sample that are renters and live in Allegheny county appears to be small. The Western Pennsylvania Conser-
vancy attracts a large number of donors from outside of Allegheny county since its main attraction – Frank
Lloyd Wright’s Falling Water – is located an hour and a half outside of Pittsburgh in the Laurel Highlands.
The WPC accounts for a large number of the dropped observations as is evident from a comparison of the
number of households reported in Table 1 with the ones in Table 2. We do not have access to real estate
data outside of Allegheny county. Omitting all donors to the WPC does not affect our main results.
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Table 2: Property Values of Donors
Number Average Median Standard Deviation
Ballet 327 $322,450 $243,600 $280,154
Carnegie Museums 806 $389,524 $323,350 $325,356
Children’s Museum 126 $383,075 $311,700 $311,661
City Theater 383 $295,484 $236,100 $283,174
Opera 373 $331,953 $260,000 $264,489
Phipps 631 $327,004 $265,000 $280,950
Public Theater 730 $287,289 $230,450 $218,276
Symphony 444 $363,339 $281,500 $312,028
WPC 850 $263,428 $190,650 $242,911
Zoo 419 $292,641 $218,800 $262,995
among households that live in the City of Pittsburgh and households that live in one of
the surrounding suburbs. Finally, we know how long a household has owned the property
which we use to construct a variable which measures the “attachment” to the Pittsburgh
metropolitan area.
The United Way is a charity that largely funds smaller charities that provide social and
community outreach services. It provides no private benefits besides social visibility. We can
thus use the information about United Way donations to proxy for heterogeneity in warm
glow within the population as explained in detail below. We obtained the list of United
Way donors. We find that 551 people who gave to one of the cultural charities also gave
to the United Way. The minimum amount of giving, such that the donor is listed in the
publication, is $1,000. The maximum gift was $1,000,000 with the average gift at $10,282
with a standard deviation of $73,615.
The individuals in our sample also contributed significantly to political candidates in
the 2004 election. Of the 6,499 individual donors, 736 contributed to at least one of the
11
Table 3: Giving to Presidential Candidates
Bush Kerry Bush Kerry
number of number of total total
donors donors amount amount
Ballet 12 (33.3%) 24 (66.7%) $19,250 $46,550
Carnegie Museums 69 (41.1%) 99 (58.9%) $118,025 $147,350
Children’s Museum 13 (41.9%) 18 (58.1%) $18,000 $34,350
City Theater 5 (7.0%) 66 (93.0%) $8,500 $99,400
Opera 15 (30.0%) 35 (70.0%) $29,000 $60,100
Phipps Conservatory 31 (36.0%) 55 (64.0%) $54,375 $97,620
Public Theater 23 (28.0%) 59 (72.0%) $46,950 $89,224
Symphony 31 (38.8%) 49 (61.3%) $58,650 $77,420
WPC 40 (35.1%) 74 (64.9%) $67,475 $115,420
Zoo 20 (54.1%) 17 (45.9%) $46,200 $39,550
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following: a presidential campaign (either George W. Bush or John Kerry), a senatorial
campaign (Arlen Specter or Joseph Hoeffel), a congressional campaign in nearby districts, or
the Republican or Democratic parties.6 Table 3 reports the number of individuals who gave
money to both the cultural organization listed and the presidential campaigns of either G.W.
Bush or J.F. Kerry. We will document in a later section of this paper that these individuals
are most receptive to private benefits such as special events and dinner parties.
Table 4: Donations from Current Board Members
# of Contributing Range Median Average Standard
Board Members Deviation
Ballet 44 $250 - $5,000 $5,000 $3,494 $1,762
Carnegie Museums 99 $500 - $25,000 $2,500 $7,449 $8,691
Children’s Museum 33 $50 - $10,000 $500 $1,782 $2,961
City Theater 39 $250 - $2,500 $2,500 $1,878 $858
Opera 69 $250 - $50,000 $5,000 $8,272 $9,359
Phipps Conservatory 44 $50 - $5,000 $475 $722 $867
Public Theater 41 $150 - $10,000 $2,500 $3,662 $2,488
Symphony 29 $500 - $25,000 $1,000 $4,345 $6,835
WPC 28 $100 - $10,000 $1,000 $2,461 $3,383
Zoo 49 $100 - $5,000 $1,000 $980 $1,031
We also observe whether an individual is a member of the board of trustees of the
organization. We treat board membership as a predetermined characteristic of a household
in our analysis.7 The ten organizations in our data set list the names of the trustees in the
same publication as the one that lists the names of donors. Table 4 reports the minimum,
6The FEC requires political contributions of $200 or more to be reported.
7This assumption rules out the case that a households donates a large amount in the current period and
is therefore put on the board. Board membership is likely to provide both prestige as well as a degree of
influence in the organization. We do not explore these issues in this paper, but view them as interesting
topics for future research.
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maximum, median, and average donation of board members along with standard deviations.
2.2.2 The Importance of Giving to Multiple Organizations
One of the striking features of our data is that many individuals donate money to multiple
causes. For example, 495 of the 6,499 individual donors are identified as giving to three or
more of our ten organizations. Table 5 provides a detailed analysis of the distribution of
donor types.
Table 5: Spread of Giving to Multiple Organizations
# of Organizations # of Donors % of Individuals Sum of % of Total
Donations Donations
1 5264 81.00% $3,076,945 45.70%
2 740 11.39% $1,363,360 20.25%
3 304 4.68% $1,034,195 15.36%
4 118 1.82% $569,485 8.46%
5 44 0.68% $327,205 4.86%
6 13 0.20% $141,160 2.10%
7 11 0.17% $115,160 1.71%
8 2 0.03% $10,095 0.15%
9 3 0.05% $94,600 1.41%
10 0 0.00% $0 0.00%
We also find that individuals who contributed to three or more organizations have dif-
ferent characteristics than the average donor. Consider the 392 donors who are listed in
the Allegheny County Real Estate Registry. Their average property value was $425,659,
substantially larger than the $292,417 of an average donor to fewer charities. Of the 392
with Allegheny County housing entries, 327 live in the city of Pittsburgh. Their average
combined giving amounted to $4,630 compared to $739 for those donors who gave to fewer
organizations. The multiple donors were also much more likely to donate to a political can-
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didate, 44 percent for the donors who gave to three or more charities compared to 17 percent
for all donors. Table 6 reports the number of donors that gave the first, second, or third
largest amounts to each organization with ties counted on the same level.
Table 6: Gift Size Ordering and Frequency among Multiple Donors
Largest Second Third Gift
Donation Largest Largest Frequency
Ballet 50 52 11 23.4%
Carnegie Museum 180 78 7 53.7%
Children’s Museum 6 18 15 10.5%
City Theater 18 77 46 31.5%
Opera 88 47 18 32.3%
Phipps Conservatory 22 104 76 49.1%
Public Theater 48 101 76 48.9%
Symphony 142 60 14 43.6%
WPC 34 103 83 48.7%
Zoo 11 36 40 22.0%
Note: The sample size is 495.
We find that organizations like the Carnegie Museums, Opera, and Symphony are “top-
heavy”, i.e. they are first or second choices for many donors. The “bottom-heavy” or-
ganizations like Phipps Conservatory, WPC, Zoo, Public Theater, City Theater, and the
Children’s Museum rarely receive the largest share of a given donor’s bankroll. The data
thus suggest that individuals strategically decide how to allocate funds among the available
charitable organizations. No one in our sample gives, for example, equal amounts to a large
subset of these organizations. The last column of Table 6 shows the percentage of the 495
multiple donors who give any money to each organization. We find that Phipps, WPC, and
the Public Theater capture about the same number of donations from the multiple donors
as the Carnegie Museums and the Symphony. However these charities are the second-choice
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destinations for charitable giving receiving less money.
Since a significant fraction of individuals donate to more than one charity, we do not
adopt a simple discrete choice approach, but a multiple discrete choice approach. These
models generate the choice set from the basic options available at each choice occasion
(Hendel, 1999).
2.2.3 The Importance of Private Benefits
In addition to the private good motive of prestige that comes with being listed in a playbill or
annual report, some organizations provide substantial private benefits to reward donations.
Organizations typically grant additional benefits to the higher levels of giving. They also
offer all benefits associated with levels of giving below your current level. Only three of the
ten organizations do not have these tiered privileges listed in their programs, annual reports,
or websites. Table 7 summarizes the number of offerings in each category that donors at the
top level are given. Appendix A.2 reports tables of private benefits for all tier of donations
in our sample.
The prevalence of private incentives suggests to model behavior as choices among bundles
of goods. Each tier of giving can be viewed as a differentiated product which comes with a
“price” and set of characteristics. The price is equal to the minimum giving amount and a
vector of private and social benefits. The observed characteristics are the private benefits.
Households differ among many observed characteristics and are likely to have different tastes
for these benefits.
2.3 MODEL
The challenge is to develop an empirical model that treats charitable donations as a differ-
entiated product and can explain donations by a single individual to multiple organizations.
Since simple discrete choice models cannot explain this behavior, Hendel (1999) suggested
to use a multiple discrete choice model. Previous applications of multiple discrete choice
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Table 7: Private Benefits Explicitly Offered to Donors in the Top Tier
Exclusive Special Events Token Autographs Free
Party Tickets Gifts Parking
Ballet 2 3 3 3 1
Carnegie Museums 5 7 5 3 1
Children’s Museum
City Theater 2 2 1 1
Opera 2 3 6 1 1
Phipps Conservatory 1 3 1 5
Public Theater
Symphony 1 4 7 3 1 1
WPC 3 2
Zoo
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models assume that different individuals make simultaneous discrete decisions. Aggregating
simple discrete choices over decision makers then yields a well defined multiple-discrete choice
model. We follow a different approach. It is more reasonable to assume in our application
that a single agent makes a sequence of discrete choices over time. The multi-discrete choice
model is then obtained by aggregating the decisions of the single individual over the relevant
time horizon.
To formalize there ideas, we assume that each donor makes decisions over the course of
one year. The year consists of T time periods. There are I charities and an outside option
denoted by 0. Each charity has Li tiers of giving that are associated with an amount of
giving gil and private benefits pil. We treat each tier of giving to each charity (each pair il)
as a separate differentiated product.
Let dilt denote an indicator function that is equal to one if a donor chooses to give to
charity i at level l at time t.8 At each point of time choices are mutually exclusive:
I∑
i=0
Li∑
l=1
dilt = 1 (2.1)
Habit formation implies that the willingness to donate is influenced by the total amount
of previous giving. Define the total amount of giving up to time t as
tgt =
t−1∑
k=1
I∑
i=0
Li∑
l=1
dilk gil (2.2)
We assume that tgt is a sufficient statistic that characterizes the history of giving. Preferences
also depend on a vector of observed, time-invariant characteristics of the household, x, such
as wealth, occupational status, party affiliation, marital status, and others. The per-period
utility at time t is given by:
Ut(dt, x, tgt, t) =
I∑
i=0
Li∑
l=1
dilt(uilt(x, tgt) + ilt) (2.3)
8We thus implicitly assume that the choice set does not depend on earlier choices. In principle it is easy
to relax this assumption and introduce another set of state variables to account for the fact that households
do not give twice to the same organization. But the additional computational burden of keeping track of
this large vector of state variables does not justify the gains. When we simulate our model we find that our
model predicts in 2 percent of the cases that households make donations twice to the same charity and in
less than 0.4 percent of the cases at the same tier. As a consequence, there is little need to impose these
constraints in estimation.
18
where t = (11t, ...ILt) denotes a vector of idiosyncratic shocks. We thus follow McFadden
(1974) and assume that the error enters the utility function in an additively separable man-
ner. Individuals know the current period shocks, but do not have perfect foresight regarding
future preference shocks.
Let st = (tgt, x, t) denote the vector of state variables at time t. Individuals are rational
and forward looking with a discount factor equal to one. Individuals, therefore, behave
according to an optimal decision rule δt(st) = dt which solves the following intertemporal
maximization problem:
max
δ=(δ1,...δT )
T∑
t=0
Eδ[Ut(dt, st)|s0 = s] (2.4)
where Eδ denotes the expectation with respect to the controlled stochastic process {st, dt}
induced by the decision rule, δ.
The model is sufficiently general to account for the fact that the previous donations
reduce available income and thus may reduce the probability of future donations. It is also
straight-forward to allow for time dependent observed characteristics such as income and
impose the budget constraint.9
We primarily use the time structure to generate multiple choice occasions which is a cen-
tral component in any multiple-discrete choice model. Allowing for multiple choice occasions
is essential to reduce the complexity of the model and avoid the curse of dimensionality of
simpler discrete choice models. If previous donations do not matter, the model is essentially
equivalent to Hendel’s model.10
9In practice, this would require observing income at the different points in time. Unfortunately, we do
not have access to quarterly income measures in our application.
10One advantage of using static models is that it is easier to account for unobserved heterogeneity in
preferences. We discuss these issues in detail below.
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2.4 ESTIMATION
2.4.1 A Parametrization
We assume that household n obtains utility of giving to charity i at level l in period t
according to the following function:
uiltn(xn, tgtn) = αil + η tgtn + ω xn + ψ ι(xn, pil) (2.5)
The fixed effect associated with product il is denoted by αil. The parameter η captures the
state dependence in our model and measures the effect of prior donations on preferences.
Note that ω measures the impact of observed heterogeneity on public giving and ψ the impor-
tance of interactions between individual characteristics and observed product characteristics,
denoted by ι(xn, pil). As discussed in detail in Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004), these in-
teractions may be important in generating an appropriate choice model.11 We assume that
αil can be decomposed into observed and unobserved characteristics as follows:
αil = α + β gil + γ pil + ξil (2.6)
where α denotes an intercept and gil the level of giving associated with the level l of charity
i. pil denotes the observed vector of private benefits such as invitations to special events and
dinners. ξij denotes an unobserved product characteristic such as social prestige.
It is useful to review how our model accounts for both giving due to “warm-glow” and
giving that is motivate by private benefits. Consider the utility specification in equations
(2.5) and (2.6). Suppose private benefits are irrelevant and donations can only be attributed
to warm glow. In that case the coefficients α and β in equation (2.6) must be different from
zero and γ must equal zero. Similarly in equation (2.5) ψ must be equal to zero. We can
thus test the hypothesis that giving is only motivated by warm-glow, by testing the null
hypothesis that ψ = 0 and γ = 0. If the alternative hypothesis is true, these coefficients are
different from zero. Then part of the giving must be attributed to private benefits.
11Our approach can be extended to deal with observed differences among charities or firms. Suppose
there is a vector z which measures observed differences among charities. We can then interact individual
characteristics with charity level characteristics.
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Estimation of the parameters of the model proceeds in two stages. In the first stage we
estimate the parameters θ1 = (αij, η, ω, ψ) using a maximum likelihood estimator. In the
second stage we estimate the remaining parameters θ2 = (α, β, γ) using a linear instrumental
variable estimator. We discuss both stages in detail below.
2.4.2 The First Stage
Since this model yields deterministic decision rules, we rely on unobserved state variables to
generate a properly defined econometric model. Each individual knows the level of previous
giving tgt, and the realizations of t when making decisions. In contrast, tgt and t are
unobserved by the econometrician.
Rust (1987) shows that if the unobserved state variables satisfy the assumptions of addi-
tive separability (AS) and conditional independence (CI), conditional choice probabilities are
well defined. If the idiosyncratic shocks in the utility function follow a Type I extreme value
distribution (McFadden, 1974), we obtain Rust’s multinomial dynamic logit specification:
Pt(dilt = 1|tgt, x) = exp(vilt(tgt, x, θ1))∑I
j=0
∑Lj
k=1 exp(vjkt(tgt, x, θ1))
(2.7)
To evaluate these conditional choice probabilities we must compute the conditional value
functions, vilt(·). Since this is a finite horizon model, we can compute the conditional value
functions recursively using backward induction. Consider the decision problem in the last
period T . In the last period, the donor solves a static decision problem and the last period
conditional value function is simply given by:
vilT (tgT , x, θ1) = uilT (tgT , x, θ1) (2.8)
For all other periods the conditional value function is defined as:
vilt(tgt, x, θ1) = uilt(x, tgt, θ1) + log(
I∑
m=0
Lm∑
n=1
exp(vmnt(tgt + gil, x, θ1))) (2.9)
The conditional value functions can thus be computed recursively.
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Estimation of the model is not straight-forward, since we do not observe choices at each
point of time. Instead, we observe for each charity i whether an individual donates at a
given level l:
dil =
T∑
t=1
dilt (2.10)
As a consequence, a standard dynamic discrete choice estimator based on the conditional
choice probabilities in equation (2.7) is not feasible. A feasible maximum likelihood estimator
for this model must be based on the probability of observing the outcomes d = (d11, ..., dLI)
conditional on the observed time-invariant household characteristics x and product char-
acteristics, z. Let these probabilities be denoted by Pt(d |x). These probabilities can be
computed from the standard conditional probabilities in equation (2.7) by integration over
all possible choice sequences.
To illustrate this procedure, consider the following example. Assume there are three
choice occasions (T = 3), three charities (I = 3), and each charity has two tiers of giving
(L = 2). Suppose we observe that an individual donates to the first charity at level 2, to
the second charity at level 1, and not to the third charity. Using our notation, we observe
d = (d11, d12, d21, d22, d31, d33) where
d12 = d21 = 1 (2.11)
d11 = d22 = d31 = d32 = 0
Let csi denote a choice sequence that is consistent with the observed behavior in equation
(2.11). Let CS denote the set of all feasible choice occasions that are consistent with the
observed choices d. Table 8 list the six choice sequences that are elements in CS in this
example.
The probability of observing the behavior in equation (2.11), given observed character-
istics x, is obtained by computing the probability of each of the six feasible choice sequences
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Table 8: Possible Choice Sequences
Feasible Choice Sequences
Choice Sequence Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
cs1 12 21 0
cs2 12 0 21
cs3 0 12 21
cs4 21 12 0
cs5 0 21 12
cs6 21 0 12
and summing over all possible sequences:
P (d| x) (2.12)
=
∑
i∈CS
P (csi| d, x)
= P1(d121 = 1 | tg1 = 0, x) P2(d212 = 1 | tg2 = g12, x) P3(d003 = 1 | tg3 = g12 + g12, x)
+ P1(d121 = 1 | tg1 = 0, x) P2(d002 = 1 | tg2 = g12, x) P3(d213 = 1 | tg3 = g12, x)
+ P1(d001 = 1 | tg1 = 0, x) P2(d122 = 1 | tg2 = 0, x) P3(d213 = 1 | tg3 = g12, x)
+ P1(d211 = 1 | tg1 = 0, x) P2(d122 = 1 | tg2 = g21, x) P3(d003 = 1 | tg3 = g21 + g12, x)
+ P1(d001 = 1 | tg1 = 0, x) P2(d212 = 1 | tg2 = 0, x) P3(d123 = 1 | tg3 = g21, x)
+ P1(d211 = 1 | tg1 = 0, x) P2(d002 = 1 | tg2 = g21, x) P3(d123 = 1 | tg3 = g21, x)
The algorithm in the example above can be generalized to deal with arbitrary number of
time periods, charities, and tiers.
To understand identification of η it is useful to consider the example above. First notice
that the example involves an individual that gives to more than one charity. If all individuals
only donated to only one charity, then we can easily conclude that η is not identified. In
the example, the individual donates to two of the three charities. There are six possible
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choice sequences that are consistent with the observed behavior. In a model in which η = 0
all choice sequences are equally likely and will receive the same weight in the likelihood
function. If η > 0, it is easy to verify that choice sequences 3 and 5 will receive more
weight than the other choice sequences because of the crowding in effect. Similarly if η < 0,
choice sequences 1 and 4 will receive more weight. Different parameters values of η thus
yield different weighting schemes for the different choice sequences and thus yield different
likelihood functions. This also implies that models with η < 0 put more weight on choice
sequences in which there is one large donation and a few small donations, indicating that
large donations are crowding out other donations. Similarly, a model with η > 0 places more
weight on observations with increasing donations. The observed behavior of individuals that
donate to multiple charities then allows us to identify η.
Observing the order of donations is not necessary for establishing identification. Note
that η primarily affects the probabilities that are assigned to different feasible choice se-
quences. We do not observe the choice sequences. We need to aggregate over the choice
sequences to generate the conditional choice probabilities. But the aggregation is linear in
the conditional choice probabilities and η enters into the conditional choice probabilities in
a highly nonlinear way. Aggregation will, therefore, not cause a lack of identification of η.
Our empirical estimates support that assessment.
It is often hard to distinguish between state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity.
Nevertheless, these two approaches rely on different assumptions about the functional form
of the utility function and thus have different implications for conditional choice probabilities
implied of the model and the shape of the likelihood function. In principle, one should be
able to differentiate among these competing explanations. In practice, it might be hard due
to small sample estimation problems and lack of power.12
We observe a sample of donors with size N . The probability of observing a vector of
choice indicators, denoted by dn, for a donor with observed characteristics xn is given by:
P (dn | xn, θ1) =
∑
csin∈CSn
P (csin| dn, xn, θ1) (2.13)
12If the model is misspecified and unobserved heterogeneity is important, one would expect that this hetero-
geneity might be captured by the state dependence variable. For a discussion of these types of identification
problems see also Gentzkow (2007).
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where the conditional choice probability P (csin| dn, xn, θ1) that is associated with a feasible
choice sequence can be computed from the underlying conditional choice probabilities of the
dynamic logit model as described above. The likelihood function is then given by:
L(θ1) = Π
N
n=1P (dn | xn, θ1) (2.14)
The parameters of the model can, therefore, be estimated using a MLE.
2.4.3 The Second Stage
The first stage of our algorithm yields an estimator of the product specific fixed effects
denoted by αˆNij . Given standard regularity assumptions, αˆ
N
ij converges almost surely to αij
for fixed J and large N . Accounting for the sequential nature of our estimation algorithm,
equation (2.6) can be written as:
αˆNil = α + β gil + γpil + ξij + u
N
ij (2.15)
Following Berry (1994), we assume that E[ξij + u
N
ij | pjk] = 0 for j 6= i and k 6= j. The
key identifying assumption in the second stage is that observed product characteristics are
uncorrelated with unobserved product characteristics. That assumption justifies the use of
observed product characteristics of other products, especially those of close substitutes, as
instruments for the endogenous price. We can then estimate the remaining parameters of
the model using a linear IV estimator.13
Before we proceed, we offer the following observations. First, we treat private benefits
such as the number of dinners or the number of invitations to parties as exogenous product
characteristics. We, therefore, impose the same identifying assumption as Berry (1994). We
observe the full set of benefits that are explicitly offered by each charity. The unobserved
characteristics are not directly chosen when the private benefits are determined. Maybe
more importantly, unobserved characteristics such as reputation are only partially under the
13As part of our robustness analysis we also estimate the parameters using OLS. Finally, we also explore
models with charity specific fixed effects αi.
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control of the charity. It thus seems reasonable to assume that the observed benefits are or-
thogonal to the unobserved characteristics. But this is ultimately an identifying assumption
that cannot be tested within our framework.
Our findings raise the interesting question why donors like invitations to special dinners
and parties. One view that is consistent with our findings is that these events provide social
networking opportunities. One could address this point and include characteristics of the
network as potential product characteristics in the model specification. But this approach
then leads us outside the standard approach since network characteristics should be viewed
as endogenous.14
Second, the IV strategy relies on the assumption that a charity sets its rewards to donors
in response to what other charities are offering. This underlying assumption of strategic
competition among charities is common in the theoretical literature. Charities that differ
in quality strategically compete for donations and government grants using fund-raising
strategies. These strategies may include private benefits or direct solicitations.15 consider
the impact of government grants on fund-raising activities in game with two charities.
Third, one convenient way to approximate the standard errors for the second stage is
given by the following equation:
(Z ′X)−1 Z ′ (Σ +
Ω
N
) Z (Z ′X)−1 (2.16)
where Z is a J × k matrix of instruments, X is a J × k matrix of regressors, and Σ is the
covariance matrix of the residuals of the regression. Ω is the asymptotic covariance matrix
of the fixed effects that are estimated in the first stage. Note that
√
N(αN −α)→ N(0,Ω).
The formula in equation (2.16) converges to standard IV formula if the sampling error of
the first stage is negligible, i.e. if N → ∞. In practice, we find that the first stage errors
14There are some obvious similarities with the literature on peer effects. We view these extensions of our
model as interesting future research.
15The first paper that modeled competition among charities is Rose-Ackerman (1982) who shows that
competition can lead to excess fund-raising. Weisbrod (1988) provides a detailed institutional analysis of the
non-for-profit sector. More recently, Romano and Yildrim (2001) show that a charity may prefer to announce
a large donation during a fundraising campaign. Vesterlund (2003) argues that fundraisers announce past
contributions to signal the quality of the charities, which could help worthwhile charities reveal their type
and help them reduce free-rider problem. It assumes donors have imperfect information on the quality of
programs offered by a charity. Andreoni and Payne (2003
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associated with the fixed effects are relatively small compared to the variance of the residuals
in the second stage.
2.4.4 Computational Considerations
There are ten charities in our applications with 76 different levels of giving and the outside
option. We assume that each choice occasion corresponds to one quarter of a year.16 We
restrict our attention to four choice occasions for computational reasons. We need to char-
acterize all feasible choice sequences in the estimation procedure and then integrate over all
feasible paths to compute the likelihood function. The main disadvantage of using only four
periods is that we lose information on individuals that decide to donate to more than four
charities. We treat those individuals as if they had just donated money to their four most
preferred charities.
In our application almost all donation amounts can be expressed in increments of $50.
This imposes a natural way to discretize the choice space.17 We compute the value function
for every possible state using a backward recursion algorithm. We use a simulated annealing
method to compute the MLE. We find that this method performs better in our application
than simpler algorithms such as the simplex algorithm. The code of the simulated annealing
algorithm is taken from Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers (1994) which we translated into FOR-
TRAN 90.18 We use numerical derivatives to calculate asymptotic standard errors based on
the outer product of the score vector.
We use parallel processing techniques and estimate the parameters of the model on a
machine provided by the Pittsburgh Supercomputing Center. Estimating the model for the
full sample of 3,514 observations takes between 12 and 36 hours of computing time using
300 processors. Using a supercomputer also allows us to check for global convergence. We
change the starting points and the seeds of the random number generators and investigate
16We also experiment with a model with six choice occasions. We find that the results are qualitatively
similar to the ones reported in the next section.
17Alternatively, one could pick a coarser grid and use interpolation techniques as suggested, for example,
by Keane and Wolpin (1994).
18The sample code is available upon request from the authors. To test the code for the likelihood function,
we have conducted a number of Monte Carlo experiments. We set up these problems so that the simulated
choice data captured some of the main characteristics of the field data. The results from these experiments
show that our estimator works well in practice.
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whether the algorithm converges to the same estimates. These experiments show that our
estimates are robust and that we obtain the global maximum of the likelihood function.
2.5 RESULTS
We start with the discussion of the first stage estimation results. We estimated a number
of different versions of our model. The maximum likelihood estimates and corresponding
standard errors of four of the most interesting specifications are reported in Table 9. Column
I reports the estimates and standard errors for the baseline model. Column II reports the
estimates of an extended model which also allows for interactions between the household and
product characteristics. In Column III we add a United Way dummy as well as interactions
between product characteristics and the United Way dummy to the specification. In Column
IV we restrict the choice set to include only cultural charities.
We find that the extended versions of our model capture the main regularities in the
data reasonably well. We can clearly rule out the baseline model that does not include
interactions between household and product characteristics using standard likelihood ratio
tests. Since the extended models in Columns II and III fit the data better than the baseline
model in Column I, we primarily discuss the findings of these two models in detail below.19
We find that total past donations are significant in all our model specifications. In our
two preferred models the sign is negative, which indicates that previous giving discourages
current giving. We also estimate restricted versions of these models by setting η = 0. In
that case, there is no habit formation and individual donors solve repeated static decision
problems. We find that standard likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis that η = 0. We
thus conclude that accounting for state dependence improves the fit of our model. However,
the improvements in the fit are smaller compared to those gained by including interactions
19We do not report the estimates of the fixed effects. We find that all estimates of the fixed effects are
negative. This is not surprising since we have normalized the mean utility of the outside option (no giving)
equal to zero. 81 percent of the households in our sample only give to one charity. The model thus needs to
generate choice sequences in the outside option is the preferred choice in more than 80 percent of the data
points. As a consequence the mean utilities of the other choices are negative. Everything else equal, most
individuals prefer not to donate at any given point of time.
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Table 9: First Stage Results
I II III IV
Baseline Model Extended Model Extended Model Extended Model
with United Way Arts Only
Lawyer -73.46 -72.78 -120.53 -124.91
(73.5) (73.56) (122.3) (101.76)
Physician -52.04 -43.89 -28.81 -102.92
(80.3) 80.80 (50.70) (120.97)
Republican 218.37 67.23 30.21 -168.50
(67.6) (84.06) (45.8) (125.34)
Democrat 295.11 323.08 306.88 381.03
(61.7) (75.81) (74.8) (102.80)
House value 516.8 203.8 187.29 -61.24
(93.3) (123.39) (122.0) (158.86)
Mean income -5.66 17.42 -0.01 16.20
(83.9) (83.91) (82.3) (115.95)
Membership 372.49 59.66 55.08 -15.62
(70.5) (76.60) (75.1) (97.6)
Married 175.11 185.29 174.33 101.76
(56.6) (56.87) (60.0) (79.40)
Years House 7.01 7.04 7.34 5.42
(2.8) (2.81) (2.7) ( 4.29)
United Way 226.37 -14.65
(74.1) (102.21)
Lagged Giving 28.55 -40.79 -45.61 -171.18
(6.4) (19.64) (21.9) (28.7)
log likelihood 20636.92 20363.51 20346.99 12224.56
Note: All coefficients and standard errors are inflated by a factor of 103 .
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between household and product characteristics.
Table 9 also reports the estimates that measure the impact of personal characteristics on
giving. Most of the coefficients have the expected sign, but not all are statistically significant.
One key advantage of our data set is that we observe many characteristics of our donors.
Most importantly, we know the value of the donor’s main residence, which is a good proxy
for household wealth. We also control for the neighborhood income of each household. We
find that total donations increase with house value and neighborhood income, but only house
value is typically significant.
We include a variable called “years lived in the house” which measures attachment to
the Pittsburgh community. We find that households that have lived in the community for a
longer period of time tend to give more. This could be due to stronger ties to the community.
We also construct an indicator that equals one if the household lives in the City of Pittsburgh
and zero otherwise. City residents may have a higher demand for the services offered by these
charities than suburban residents who face higher commuting costs to attend events. We find
that city residents also have stronger tastes for charitable giving than suburban households.
Married couples donate larger amounts than singles. We also include two dummy variables
indicating whether an individual in the household is a physician or a lawyer. These variables
are typically insignificant.
We also estimate the coefficients of two dummy variables based on a household’s political
affiliations. We find that households that are politically active – especially those who donate
to Democratic candidates – are more likely to support local cultural charities. Finally, we
find that households that support the United Way typically donate more as well. The United
Way offers few if any private benefits. Individuals who support the United Way may be less
selfish or may have an active interest in public welfare or the good of the local community.
We can thus interpret the United Way dummy as a proxy that captures heterogeneity in
warm glow or public spirits in the population.
To get additional insights into the effectiveness of private benefits in fundraising and the
importance of heterogeneity among donors, we turn to the estimates of the interaction effects
reported in Table 10. The estimates reveal that household with higher personal wealth tend
to donate more money than households with lower wealth. The same is true for households
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Table 10: First Stage Results: Interactions
I II III IV
Baseline Model Extended Model Extended Model Extended Model
with United Way Arts Only
Amount * House value 36.18 39.82 69.32
(20.36) (21.9) (20.22)
Amount * Membership 330.75 327.94 321.20
(16.29) (15.6) (17.00)
Amount * United Way -10.76 -24.62
(8.5) (27.33)
Dinner * Republican 225.49 177.74 216.61
(69.74) (67.6) (71.83)
Dinner * Democrat 100.91 68.32 84.49
(75.43) (74.3) (78.69)
Dinner * House value 127.83 113.43 138.56
(100.24) (98.4) (102.91)
Dinner * United Way 222.26 197.16
(68.8) (89.20)
Event * Republican 67.12 68.19 78.64
(23.94) (23.7) (28.82)
Event * Democrat -19.21 -19.74 -56.04
(24.73) (24.8) (27.99)
Event * House value 138.17 123.03 102.72
(24.74) (24.6) (29.96)
Event * United Way 8.99 86.54
(6.5) (27.41)
Note: All coefficients and standard errors are inflated by a factor of 103 .
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that are members of the board of trustees.
We also find that households that are politically active value invitations to special events
and dinner parties. This is especially true for Republicans for whom we consistently find
large positive and significant effects. This finding is intriguing and raises some interesting
research questions. We know, for example, that households that finance political campaigns
often expect some favors from the politician that they support. There is a clear quid pro quo
when supporting candidates that run for political office. The same types of households also
place higher values on private benefits such as invitations to special dinner. This finding is
consistent with a number of potential explanations. One of them focuses on the role that
social networks play in the local society. One function of these charities may be to provide
social networking opportunities to interested individuals.
Adding interactions between the observed characteristics and the United Way dummy
does not alter the main findings. Note that the interactions with the amount given and
invitations to special events are insignificant while the interaction with dinner parties is
positive and significant. The other estimates are not substantially affected by the inclusion
of these interactions. Again, these findings are consistent with the view that the United Way
dummy can be interpreted as a variable that captures heterogeneity in “warm glow” in the
population. However, even unselfish donors may appreciate some acknowledgment. Thus it
may not surprising to find that the interaction with dinners is also positive and significant.
It is possible that there is heterogeneity in tastes for the different charities that is not
captured by the logit errors in our model. In particular, there may be heterogeneity in
tastes between environmental and art charities. To test this hypothesis, we eliminate all
environmental and wildlife charities from our choice set (the Zoo, the WPC, and the Phipps
Conservatory). We then estimate our model using this smaller choice set.20 This test is
then in the spirit of Hausman and McFadden (1984) who suggested a similar procedure to
evaluate whether the IIA property holds in a logit model. We report the estimates for the
arts-only-specification in the last columns of Tables 9 and 10. Comparing the estimates
in column III with those in column IV, we find that the estimates are both qualitatively
and quantitatively similar to our previous estimates that are based on the full sample. A
20Notice that we also dropped all observations in the sample that only donated to these three charities.
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small number of estimates change sign, but these estimates are typically not significant in
both specifications. Most importantly, the key parameter estimates in Table 10 that capture
the interactions between individual heterogeneity and donation characteristics are virtually
unchanged. These findings suggest that unobserved heterogeneity in tastes between arts and
environmental charities is not a substantial problem in this application.
The test above cannot rule out the possibility that there are other potential unobserved
correlations in tastes that we have not modeled. One procedure to capture unobserved
heterogeneity is to use discrete types as suggested by Heckman and Singer (1984). This
approach has been successfully applied in dynamic discrete choice models since the work by
Keane and Wolpin (1997). However, this approach is computationally expensive , even if
one uses an EM algorithm in estimation (Arcidiacono, Sieg, and Sloan, 2007). Alternatively,
one can use a random coefficient logit type specifications of the utility function. But, this
approach is even more difficult to implement in our application. It increases the state space
requirements even more than the Heckman and Singer approach. In contrast to simple static
model, our approach requires the repeated numerical computation of value functions as part
of a nested fixed point algorithm.
Next we consider the within sample fit of the model. Table 11 compares selected moments
from the data with moments predicted by the baseline and the extended model. We focus
on the number of donors, median and average donation levels for the data and a simulated
sample of the same size. We find that our models fit the distribution of donors among
charities and the median and average level of donations very well.
Next we turn our attention to the second stage results which are based the specification
of the model reported in Column II of Table 9. Table 12 reports the results of ordinary least
squares and two stage least squares regressions. The IV estimators use characteristics of
close substitutes as instruments for the total amount of donations. We use estimators with
and without charity specific fixed effects.
We find that the results are quite similar across IV and OLS specifications. In particular,
the price effect is negative even when we use OLS. Thus in contrast to many applications in
industrial organization, we do not obtain counter-intuitive price effects without the use of
appropriate instruments. This finding may be due to the fact that the correlation between
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Table 11: Goodness of Fit: Estimated and Simulated Moments
mean S.D. # Donors median
Ballet Data 818.11 1201.94 323 250
Model I 794.43 1165.13 322 312
Model II 829.10 1215.98 321 381
Carnegie M Data 1930.97 3709.59 804 1000
Model I 1825.06 3486.76 816 750
Model II 1897.89 3704.03 802 850
Children M Data 610.27 1756.10 112 100
Model I 624.72 1699.90 109 103
Model II 563.19 1607.00 113 107
City Theater Data 363.64 665.19 374 100
Model I 375.06 674.13 377 100
Model II 363.63 667.05 368 100
Opera Data 2029.13 5340.50 369 500
Model I 2130.59 5454.45 379 462
Model II 1977.20 5276.78 370 443
Phipps Data 176.89 258.07 608 100
Model I 176.19 253.32 607 100
Model II 175.86 250.01 592 100
Public Theater Data 402.09 1054.36 718 50
Model I 392.63 1007.05 713 100
Model II 386.12 1018.65 711 90
Symphony Data 2161.40 4213.06 443 1000
Model I 2180.97 4268.37 444 1000
Model II 2136.88 4109.60 445 1000
Note: The simulated moments are averages over 20 simulated samples
with 3512 observations.
Model I has no interactions while model II accounts for interactions.
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Table 12: Second Stage Estimates
IV OLS IV IV
no FE no FE FE no FE
Amount -433 -397 -459 -265
(30 (25) (40) (42)
Event 148 97 229 221
(65) (51) (207) (74)
Dinner 149 64 162 272
(126) (123) (187) (248)
Free Parking 782
(721)
Estimated standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
FE refers to charity level fixed effects.
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prices and unobserved product characteristics is weaker in our application.21
Households value invitations to dinner parties as well as special events.22 We also esti-
mate a model that includes free parking as a private benefit. The point estimate suggests
that households value free parking, but the estimate comes with a large standard error. Com-
paring the IV estimates with and without charity fixed effects, we find that the estimated
coefficients are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. The main difference is that including
fixed effects increases the estimates of the asymptotic standard errors. We expect that one
might be able to obtain more precise estimates in a larger sample. We conclude that our
estimates are reasonable and consistent with the view that private benefits are important
motives for philanthropic behavior.
2.6 POLICY ANALYSIS
2.6.1 The Importance of the Composition of the Choice Set
To get some additional insights into the role that private benefits play in attracting charitable
donations, we conduct a number of counter-factual policy experiments. First, we add one
additional dinner invitation to the highest tier at the Carnegie Museum. We chose the
Carnegie Museum since it is the largest organization in our sample. Our model implies that
an additional dinner party for the most generous donors would raise approximately $197,425.
We repeated the exercise for the Children’s Museum which is one of the smaller organizations
in our sample. A dinner party for the Children’s Museum, in contrast, would only net
$11,019. There are thus some important quantitative differences among the organizations
in our sample. The intuition for this finding is that the attractiveness of a dinner parties
depends on the overall appeal of the charity. These simulations also suggest that charities
may not be behave as revenue maximizers. While this finding may be surprising at first sight,
there is some evidence in the literature that supports this view of charitable organizations
21The R2 of our first stage of the 2SLS estimation for our model without fixed effects is 0.52.
22We estimated additional versions of the model that are not reported in this paper and found that special
tickets and token gifts are, surprisingly, not valued by donors.
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Weisbrod (1988).
We do not know how much money the organizations in our sample spend when organizing
a dinner party or a special event. As a consequence we do not perform a complete benefit-cost
analysis in the paper. But the costs for hosting a special event such as a meeting with the
conductor or the director of a show are probably small. Dinners are typically catered by an
outside company and are thus more expensive than other social functions. The opportunity
costs of having a free, special performance are the foregone ticket revenues.
Next, we consider the impact of changes in the choice set. Looking at these changes
is interesting since it helps to understand the impact of changes in fundraising strategies.
We consider policies that eliminate choices and thus simplify the menu for potential donors.
First, we eliminate the $2000-2500 tier of giving at the Carnegie Museum. Our model predicts
that the total amount of donations would decline by $182,675. Eliminating the lowest tier
for the Pittsburgh Opera reduces the number of donors by 28 percent with a reduction in
total donations of approximately $50,400.
Recall that 19 percent of donors in our sample give to multiple charities. Their donations
account for 54.3 percent of total donations To highlight the importance of these donors we
solve our model assuming that each donor gives to, at most, one charity. The results are
summarized in Table 13. We find that this restriction results in less donations, both mea-
sured by the average donations to charities and the number of donors. There are important
differences among the charities. Larger charities such as the Symphony, Opera, and Carnegie
Museum, more heavily rely on these donors than smaller charities.
2.6.2 The Importance of Private Benefits
We can solve our model under the assumption that all charities eliminate all private benefits
as incentives to attract donors. The results of this policy experiment are summarized in
Table 14. For each charity, the first row reports the sample statistics. The second row shows
the predictions of our model in the absence of private benefits.23
23When we eliminate private benefits, we do not reduce the number of elements in the choice set. We
keep all the tiers of each charity and just remove private benefits. Each tier has a separate logit error.
Alternatively, we could assume that each charity only offers one tier of donations. Since each donation tier
has a separate logit error, charities that offered multiple tiers would be less attractive after the policy change
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Note that the Zoo, the Public Theater, the Western Pennsylvania Conservatory, and
the Children’s Museum do not use special events and dinners as fundraising tools. As
a consequence their overall donations are not significantly affected by eliminating private
benefits. If anything, these charities experience a small increase in the number of donors and
the total level of donations since these charities are now more attractive compared to charities
that heavily rely on private incentives. The Phipps Conservatory holds a single special event
for top donors. Our model predicts that this event raises approximately $15,000 in additional
donations which may not be enough to cover costs. The Ballet, the Symphony, the Opera,
and the Carnegie Museums all rely heavily on special events and dinners as fundraising tools.
Top donors for the Carnegie Museum are invited to five dinners and five special events. Our
model predicts that special events generate a large fraction of the annual donations. Perhaps
most surprisingly, we find that the number of individuals that donate to multiple charities
will be significantly lower without private benefits. Thus, private benefits affect both giving
behavior to the favorite charity as well as charities that rank second or third.
It is important to distinguish the impact of altruism and private benefits on charitable
giving, as argued by Rosen and Meer (2009). Based on the policy experiment above, we can
compare the total donations to charities with and without providing private benefits. Note
that we do not eliminate the benefit of being listed in the program which may provide social
prestige. We find that the contributions attributed to altruism or warm-glow are 48 percent
for Ballet, 29 percent for Carnegie Museum, 87 percent for City Theater, 23 percent for
Opera, 86 percent for Phipps, 28 percent for Symphony. Note that the Children Museum,
the Public Theater, WPC, and Zoo, do not use private benefits. Hence all donations to those
organizations are primarily driven by altruism or warm-glow.
under this alternative scenario. For a discussion of alternative approaches for dealing with the logit errors
in these types of simulations see Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) and Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2009).
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2.7 CONCLUSIONS
Individuals have a long list of causes from which they can choose to donate money. It is vitally
important for cultural organizations to court potential donors. A better understanding of the
preferences of donors will allow these organizations to personalize the fundraising process and
attract increased donations. To appeal to private donors, most organizations offer a variety
of private benefits in addition to rewarding donors by printing their names in brochures,
playbills, and annual reports. More importantly, organizations host exclusive dinner parties
and extend invitations to special events to important donors. We have shown the importance
of these benefits for annual fundraising strategies. We find that exclusive private benefits
are particular popular among aﬄuent donors and donors that are politically active.
We have distinguished in this paper between the motives for giving and the motives
for participating in social events that are open to select donors. Our analysis primarily
focused on the former and has less to say about the later. We have briefly discussed some
possible explanations why donors may want to participate in these events. Social prestige or
networking opportunities are the obvious candidates. Our findings are also consistent with
the fact that dinner parties are notoriously popular to raise political campaign contributions.
Individuals often pay large amounts of money per plate at a fundraising dinner for access to
a candidate. More research is needed to address these open questions.
The main sample used in estimating our model is random conditional on giving to at
least one of the ten charities. It is, therefore, straight forward to interpret our results. The
results of our paper cannot be used to infer anything about the behavior of those households
that did not support one of these charities. Studying these participation decisions is an
important area for future research.
Our methodological approach is flexible and has many other potential applications. Our
approach extends to other settings where consumers demand multiple units of different prod-
ucts. Our methods can also be used to study topics outside of industrial organization. Con-
sider, for example, demand models in recreational and environmental economics where indi-
viduals take multiple trips to different beaches which vary by amenities. Other applications
arise in transportation economics when commuters use different means of transportation.
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Dubin-McFadden (1984) and Hanemann (1984) have proposed estimators for these types of
model that allow for one discrete and one continuous choice. Our method allows consumers
to choose more than one differentiated product. We can view the techniques proposed in
this paper as extensions of their methods.
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Table 13: Policy Analysis: Only Give to One Charity
Charity Number of Median Average
Donors Donations Donations
Ballet status quo 323 250 818.11
only give to one 186 331 770.18
Carnegie M status quo 804 1000 1930.97
only give to one 476 975 1630.94
Children M status quo 112 100 610.27
only give to one 69 100 571.82
City Theater status quo 374 100 363.64
only give to one 227 100 386.44
Opera status quo 369 500 2029.13
only give to one 217 375 1446.20
Phipps status quo 608 100 176.89
only give to one 324 100 168.34
Public Theater status quo 718 50 402.09
only give to one 436 65 370.40
Symphony status quo 443 1000 2161.40
only give to one 252 1000 1730.13
WPC status quo 832 100 343.99
only give to one 518 100 316.03
Zoo status quo 406 50 234.24
only give to one 246 76 232.29
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Table 14: Policy Analysis: A Ban of Private Benefits
Charity Number of Median Average
Donors Donations Donations
Ballet status quo 323 250 818.11
no private benefits 202 250 629.66
Carnegie M status quo 804 1000 1930.97
no private benefits 402 500 1116.73
Children M status quo 112 100 610.27
no private benefits 122 107 657.34
City Theater status quo 374 100 363.64
no private benefits 399 100 297.81
Opera status quo 369 500 2029.13
no private benefits 192 215 913.12
Phipps status quo 608 100 176.89
no private benefits 555 100 167.01
Public Theater status quo 718 50 402.09
no private benefits 793 95 404.71
Symphony status quo 443 1000 2161.40
no private benefits 165 1000 1627.12
WPC status quo 832 100 343.99
no private benefits 919 100 389.58
Zoo status quo 406 50 234.24
no private benefits 458 76 233.88
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3.0 MANAGERIAL CAPACITY, FUNDRAISING PRODUCTIVITY AND
DONATIONS TO CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Donations are major revenue resources of charitable organizations that account for 8 percent
of wages and salaries paid in the United States and received 283 billions of dollars private
contributions in 2007 (National Center for Charitable Statistics, NCCS). Understanding the
determinants of donations is not only critical for the success of charities, but also has im-
portant policy implications, especially, the crowding out effects from government grants on
private donations to charities1. Previous literature mainly focuses on the crowding out anal-
ysis, for example, Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986), Gruber and Hungerman (2007) and
Heutel (2009). Recent developments emphasize the importance of fundraising expenditure
for crowding out and donations to charities. Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2009) show that
government grants crowd out charities’ fundraising expenditure significantly, which will fur-
ther reduces donations to charities even more than the direct impact from government grants
on private donations.
Fundraising expenditure and government grants are essential components in the study of
donation determination, however, they are still not sufficient for a thorough understanding
for the following reasons. First of all, fundraising expenditure only accounts for a small part
1Theoretically, the crowding out can be complete or incomplete, depending on whether donors are pure or
impure altruistic and thus whether donors see government grants as perfect or imperfect substitute of their
own contributions (Warr, 1982; Robert, 1984; Andreoni,1989, 1990). Empirical studies, such as Kingma
(1989), Khanna, Posnett and Sandler (1995), Payne (1998), Okten and Weisbrod (2000), Ribar and Wilhelm
(2002), Hungerman (2005), find that crowding out can be positive, zero, or even negative. Some studies
demonstrate the crowding in effects of government grants on private donations since government funding can
serve as signals of charities’ quality (Heutel, 2009). More details can be found in the survey by Andreoni
(2006).
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of charities’ total expenditure–it is five percent for the environmental/green charities studied
in this paper. Moreover, the variation of donations is very high even for charities with similar
amount of fundraising expenditure and for the same charity in different years. Last, many
charities do not receive government grants–it is 54 percent for green charities, so other factors
might be more important for these charities to raise donations. More fundamental concerns
about the impact of government grants are whether donors know about the government
grants to charities and whether they care about such information (Horne, Johnson, and Van
Slyke, 2005).2
Previous studies have modeled donations as the output of a “production” process treating
fundraising expenditure and government grants as inputs. The innovation of my study is
that I incorporate managerial capacity and fundraising productivity as additional factors
into the production of donations. I demonstrate that failure to include these factors can
cause significant bias in the estimation of the donation function and the evaluation of the
crowding out effects.
Managerial capacity is an approximation to the notion of “organization capacity” that
draws a lot of attention in the nonprofit practice (Backer et al., 2001) and is measured by the
accumulated stock value of managerial expenses which account for a large part of the total
expenses of charities–19 percent for green charities. Managerial capacity incorporates both
human capital accumulated through investment in human resources and physical capital
accumulated through investment in facility/infrastructure. Intuitively, better management
team and better physical infrastructure can help charities to be more effective in fundraising.
The public, however, impose much pressure on charities to reduce managerial expenses be-
cause of the belief that managerial spending may waste the resources for charitable causes.
Despite of the importance and controversy of managerial expenses, their long-run impact on
donations has not been well studied in the literature.
Fundraising productivity is employed to capture the impact of unobserved factors that
affect a charity’s effectiveness in fundraising, such as charities’ reputation in providing public
goods and donors’ social preferences for different causes. It is easier to raise more donations
2Methodologically, the experimental approach might be an important alternative way of studying crowd-
ing out since it can better control or manipulate the impact of external funding, such as government grants,
as shown in Vesterlund, Wilhelm, and Xie (2009).
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using the same amount of fundraising expenditure if a charity has a prestigious establishment
or deals with a significant social issue. Moreover, the heterogeneity of productivity is critical
in evaluating the performance of an organization and the impact of policy changes, which
has long been recognized in the literature of production function estimation (Grilliches and
Mairesse, 1998; Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes, 2006; Aguirregabiria, 2009), but not
explored in the empirical study of donation function. This paper attempts to demonstrate
the impact of fundraising productivity on donations.
Though not observed by researchers, fundraising productivity is known to charities when
they make decisions on fundraising and managerial expenses. This generates the correla-
tion between the unobserved productivity and other explanatory variables in the donation
function. The dynamics related to managerial capacity help clarify and resolve this endo-
geneity problem arising from the fundraising productivity that is charity-specific and serially-
correlated. I employ the methodology developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), which is close
to the dynamic panel data model (Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000). The identification strat-
egy utilizes the fact that the observed management expenses incorporate the information of
fundraising productivity and can be employed to control for the impact of the unobserved
productivity on donations.
Using the data from green charities3, the empirical analysis has the following main find-
ings. First, managerial capacity is essential in explaining the determination of donations
and has a significantly positive impact on raising donations, which demonstrates the long-run
benefits of charities’ investment in management. Second, after controlling for the unobserved
productivity, the estimated impact from managerial capacity on donations is increased by
67 percent, while the impact from fundraising expenditure is reduced by 57 percent. This
shows that the endogeneity problem caused by fundraising productivity plays an important
role in the analysis. Moreover, it implies that the indirect crowding out effects, that is the
multiplication of the impact from government grants on fundraising and the impact from
fundraising on donations, might be overestimated. Third, after estimating the donation
3 There is a growing literature on green charities. Heutel (2007) compares the differences between green
charities and other charities of social services and finds significant differences both in the summary statistics of
the data and the empirical analysis of crowding out. Straughan and Pollak (2008) investigate environmental
and animal related charities based on descriptive statistics of their tax form information.
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function, I compute a measure of fundraising productivity and show that it is a key factor
in explaining the variation of donations. Government grants policy should take charities’
differences in fundraising productivity into consideration, for instance, the matching grants
policy is not effective for charities with low fundraising productivity.
The empirical framework in this paper incorporates the dynamics of managerial expenses
and the heterogeneity of charities and can be used in charity evaluation.4 The commonly
used measures to evaluate charities are the ratio of donation over fundraising expenditure
and the ratio of overhead-cost (sum of fundraising and management expenses) over total
expenses. Such measures are designed to capture charities’ efficiency in fundraising and
their effectiveness in providing public goods, however, they do not reflect the corresponding
long-run benefits but incorporate the sunk costs of long-run development strategies, such as
investment in managerial capacity (NCCS, 2004).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 and 4
present the model and the methodology. Section 5 reports the empirical results, and section
6 provides more analysis on donation determination and fundraising efficiency. Section 7
concludes the paper.
3.2 DATA
3.2.1 Green Charities
The nonprofit sector has a long history in the United States5 and has continued to thrive
for centuries. In 2008, 1,514,821 tax-exempt organizations were registered with the Internal
Revenue Service, including 956,760 public charities and 112,959 private foundations. In 2007,
public charities reported nearly $2.6 trillion total assets and $1.4 trillion total revenues.6
4A few other papers also study the dynamics in charitable giving. For instance, Landry, Lange, List,
Price, and Rupp (2009) and Card, Hallock, and Moretti (2009).
5As Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, and Stanton (2008) write, “Absent an established governmental frame-
work, the early settlers formed charitable and other ‘voluntary’ associations, such as hospitals, fire depart-
ments, and orphanages, to confront a wide variety of issues and ills of the era”.
6The statistics are obtained from the Core Files 2007 and the Business Master File 12/2008, the National
Center for Charitable Statistics.
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This paper focuses on green charities that preserve, protect and improve the environment.
Green charities consist of an important force in resolving the environmental challenges fac-
ing us both locally and globally. Green charities have salient features, for instance, they
receive respectively 46 and 16 percent of their total revenues from private contributions and
government grants, compared to 12 and 9 percent for all public charities (Straughan and
Pollak, 2008). Most of previous economic studies of charitable organizations mainly focus
on arts, social service, or religious groups, so the analysis of green charities can be seen as
an important compliment.
In the organizational classification system (NCCS, 2007), green charities, under C cat-
egory, have 20 centile groups which can be further summarized into seven decile groups,
as shown in Table 15. The total observations in the data from 1998 to 2003 are 28,953
from around 5000 charities; nearly half of them come from natural resources conservation &
protection (C30-C36).
3.2.2 Data Resource
The data comes from the “NCCS-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database (NNRD)”
from the National Center for Charitable Statistics. The NNRD data collects all the informa-
tion in most financial sections and some information in non-financial sections of the federal
tax returns Forms 990 and Forms 990-EZ of those organizations required to file tax forms
with IRS, i.e., the secular charities with annual gross receipts of more than $25,000.
The main variables used in the empirical analysis are private donations, fundraising ex-
penses, managerial and general expenses, and government grants. Private donations include
contributions from individuals, cooperatives, and foundations. Donations could be finan-
cial endowment, capital campaigns, in-kind gifts, or revenues from fund-raising events for
which the contributor receives nothing of value in return from the organization. Fundrais-
ing expenses are, according to the instructions for Form 990 and Form 990-EZ, “the total
expenses incurred in soliciting contributions, gifts, grants, etc.” Managerial and general ex-
penses, simply called managerial expenses, are those costs associated with providing overall
administration to an organization, and include personnel costs, accounting and legal fees,
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Table 15: Mission and Observations of Centile Groups of Green Charities: 1998-2003
Code Mission Nature of Centile Groups Observation Percentage
Number in Total
C01 Alliances & Advocacy 316 1.1
C02 Management & Technical Assistance 113 0.4
C03 Professional Societies & Associations 383 1.3
C05 Research Institutes & Public Policy Analysis 434 1.5
C11 Single Organization Support 616 2.1
C12 Fund Raising & Fund Distribution 206 0.7
C19 Support NEC (Not Elsewhere Classified) 899 3.1
C20 Pollution Abatement & Control 1618 5.6
C27 Recycling 517 1.8
C30 Natural Resources Conservation & Protection 7681 26.5
C32 Water Resources, Wetlands Conservation & Management 2039 7.0
C34 Land Resources Conservation 2937 10.1
C35 Energy Resources Conservation & Development 424 1.5
C36 Forest Conservation 637 2.2
C40 Botanical, Horticultural & Landscape Services 187 0.6
C41 Botanical Gardens & Arboreta 791 2.7
C42 Garden Clubs 1493 5.2
C50 Environmental Beautification 1550 5.4
C60 Environmental Education 1837 6.3
C99 Environment NEC 4273 14.8
Total 28953 100
Resources: NCCS-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database, National Center for Charitable Statistics.
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expenditure in office management and outlays for equipment and supplies. Government
grants, according to the instructions, are “that encourage an organization receiving the
grant to carry on programs or activities that further its exempt purposes”, but are different
from government contracts that are treated as part of program service revenue.
There are several issues of the data that will be carefully examined in the empirical
analysis. First, 53 percent of the total observations of green charities between 1998 and
2003 come from those that never report fundraising expenses in the sample periods. Among
these observations, 29 percent are from charities with positive private donations; on average
they receive 35 percent of their revenues from donations. Second, 54 percent of the total
observations come from green charities that never receive government grants. These charities
are only a little smaller on average than those receiving government grants. The two groups
of charities, with and without government grants, obtain the same proportion of revenues
from donations, but receive respectively 20 and 44 percent of total revenues from other
sources. The features of observations with zeros are illustrated in Table 16 using data from
land conservations. Third, the main variables have large variances, are right skewed and
peaked on small values. These problems alleviated by taking logarithm or focusing on a
subgroup of the charities.
Table 16: Observations with and without Zeros in C34
group obs. donation government program rev- other rev-
# (don.) grants nue(prgrev) nue(otherev)
0 government grants 1337 366208 0 127327 147099
others 1600 1354262 218221 97210 157882
0 fundraising & positive don. 672 578718 96096 43409 41423
others 1924 1178556 145724 146055 172684
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group total rev. (tr) don./tr grant/tr prgrev/tr otherev/tr
0 government grants 640634 .513 0 .093 .394
others 1827576 .498 .203 .068 .231
0 fundraising & positive don. 759645 .51 .142 .076 .272
others 1643019 .592 .11 .072 .226
3.2.3 Summary Statistics
The salient differences in total assets, revenues, and expenses among subgroups of green
charities are captured by Figure 1. Such differences are largely driven by their mission
natures. For instance, Botanical Gardens & Arboreta (C41), Natural Resources Conservation
& Protection (C30) and Land Resources Conservation (C34) accumulate the highest level
of assets, respectively 8.72, 4.02 and 3.77 million dollars on average, because conserving
natural resources leads to huge accumulated assets. Salient heterogeneity also exists in
charities’ financial structures which again are related to the missions and characteristics
of charities. For example, the Energy Resources Conservation & Development (C35) group
receives $828,316 government grants, almost 8 times the average, and earns $800,000 program
service revenues, much more than other groups, through presumably their expertise in energy
efficiency or clean energy.
Given the salient heterogeneity related to different groups of green charities, it seems
more appropriate to start the analysis from a sample of charities within a narrower defined
category. I begin with the group of land resources conservations (category C34) that pre-
serve and protect endangered land resources from indiscriminate development, destruction
or decay, for instance, conservation of forests, rangeland, vegetation, deserts, wild and scenic
rivers and other wilderness areas and open land spaces. The reasons are the following. First,
the group of land resources conservations is one of the largest groups of green charities and
accounts for 10 percent of the whole data set. Second, it is easy to enlarge this sample by in-
corporating other natural resources conservations with similar mission nature, such as those
in Natural Resources Conservation & Protection (category C30, accounting for 27 percent of
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Figure 1: Total Assets, Revenues and Expenses of Centile Groups of Green Charities
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total observations) and Water Resources, Wetlands Conservation & Management (category
C32, accounting for 7 percent).
For land conservations, the scatter plots (in logarithm) between donations and fundrais-
ing expenditure and that between donations and government grants are shown in Figure 2
and Figure 3. The summary statistics of green charities and land resources conservations
are shown in Table 17.
Several empirical regularities from the summary statistics are relevant for our analysis.
First, donations are the major revenue resources for the environmental charities and account
for 37 percent of the total revenues. For land resource conservations, donations account for 51
percent of their total revenues on average, so understanding the determination of donations
is especially relevant for green charities. Second, managerial expenses are much larger than
fundraising expenses. The percentages of managerial expenses in total expenses are 14 and
19 for all green charities and land resources conservations. Because of the importance of
donations and managerial expenses in charities’ total revenues and total expenses, one key
part of this study is to demonstrate how managerial expenses affect donations to charities.
3.3 MODEL
This section presents a behavioral model of charities that operate along discrete time and
make decisions on fundraising and management to maximize their present discounted value
of current and future payoffs. The model clarifies the conditions needed for identification
and estimation.
3.3.1 Per-Period Payoff Function
The per-period payoff function, pijt, of charity j at time t is set as a composite of the revenue,
rjt, minus the disutility, cjt, of overhead expenditures in fundraising expenditure, ejt, and
management expenditure, mjt. Formally,
pijt = rjt − cjt = (djt + gjt)− c(ejt,mjt, gjt), (3.1)
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Figure 2: Donations and Fundraising Expenditure for Land Conservations
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Figure 3: Donations and Government Grants for Land Conservations
54
Table 17: Summary Statistics of Main Variables and Financial Ratios of Green Charities
and Land Conservations
private government total fundraise manage total
donation grants rev exp exp exp
All mean 534 118 998 40.5 95.7 751
s. d. 7,584 848 12,000 719 819 7,514
med. 26.6 0 141 0 11.0 113
Land mean 904 119 1,287 27.3 79.7 764
Cons s. d. 6,300 548 7,166 125 489 5,147
erve med. 92.9 0 205 0 13.1 107
donation in grants in program fundraise management donation/
total rev total rev total rev in total exp in total exp fundraise
All mean .368 .125 .173 .032 .143 133
s. d. 1.84 .27 .804 .081 .194 3,007
med. .171 0 0 0 .083 11
Land mean .505 .111 .079 .049 .187 358
Cons s. d. .879 .265 .207 .094 .232 7,061
erve med. .594 0 0 .0002 .116 18
Note: 1. In total revenue, except donation, grants, and program revenue, the remaining part
is called other revenues which account for approximately 30 percent; in total expenditure,
except fundraising and management expenditure, the remaining part is program service
expenditure which account for approximately 60 percent. 2. The ratio of donation
to fundraising expenditure is the commonly used measure of fundraising efficiency. 3.
Resources: the NCCS-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database, 1998-2003.
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where rjt is the sum of donations, djt, and government grants, gjt, and c(ejt,mjt, gjt) rep-
resents the opportunity costs from overhead expenditures and the impact of government
grants.
Charities are assumed to get revenues only from donations and government grants. In
reality, however, charities typically receive program service revenues and other revenues.
These are not specified explicitly in the model because the research objective focuses on the
process of donation generation and the impact of government grants. Alternatively, one can
understand other revenues as part of “government grants”. Moreover, such simplification
has no impact on the development of the empirical strategy and the following analysis. For
similar reasons, I assume that a charity spends all net revenues on their missions or providing
program services. Hence, a charity only needs to make decisions on how much to spend in
fundraising and management.
The disutility function includes direct costs and indirect costs of overhead expenditures.
Direct costs are just the sum of the expenditures in fundraising and management. Indirect
costs reflect the observation that charities may not be net revenue maximizers (Weisbrod,
1998; Andreoni and Payne, 2003). The ultimate objective of a charity is to provide charitable
services or public goods, which may conflict with the overhead expenditures. Indirect costs
may come from the legal or moral restrictions imposed on charities’ spending behavior.
Alternatively, indirect costs can be treated as the negative social image of a charity caused
by excessive spending on fundraising and management, since the public generally believes
that good charities should spend most of their revenues on program services instead of on
fundraising and management.
Government grants affect the cost function through the impact on fundraising and man-
agement expenditures. Given that charities see fundraising as “a necessary evil,” more
government grants might increase the marginal indirect-cost of fundraising expenditure and
thus reduce the expenditures in fundraising. Also, government grants may alleviate the fi-
nancial pressure of charities and encourage them to invest more in management to improve
their managerial capacity.
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3.3.2 Determination of Donations
The donation function is specified in the following log-log format:7
djt = β0 + βeejt + βggjt + βkkjt + ωjt + ξjt. (3.2)
The novel features of this specification lie in the incorporation of managerial capacity, kjt,
and fundraising productivity, ωjt. β0 can be interpreted as the mean fundraising productivity
level of charities; ξjt represent random productivity shocks not expected by charities, such
as changes in donors’ preferences and time-varying economic shocks.
The impact of fundraising expenditure, ejt, on donations can be interpreted as “the power
of the ask”, which conveys information to potential donors and alleviates the costs of giving
(Andreoni and Payne, 2003). The incorporation of government grants, gjt, comes from at
least two considerations. One is the classical crowding out hypothesis, which predicts that
donors see their contributions as perfect/imperfect substitutes for the government grants to
a charitable cause (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1986; Andreoni, 1990). The other is the
crowding-in effects, for example, Heutel (2009) shows that government grants can serve as a
signal of a charity’s quality and crowd in private donations to that charity.
Managerial capacity is a measure of the accumulated impact of a charity’s investment in
management, mjt. It is defined by
kjt = (1− δ)kjt−1 +mjt, (3.3)
where δ is the discount rate of the managerial capacity. Managerial investment has two
categories: one consists of wages and salaries of managers and employees, the other consists
of expenses on equipment, office, and other parts of operation. Correspondingly, managerial
capacity has two components: human capital and physical capital8. Higher managerial
7This formalization is an aggregated representation of charities operation in raising donations, as well as
donors’ preferences. Ideally, it is necessary to develop a behavioral model of the giving decision of donor that
accounts for the fundraising strategies and other characteristics of charities, as shown by Sieg and Zhang
(2009). Unfortunately, only charity-level data are available here, so I follow this traditional donation function
approach to make the analysis simple and comparable.
8One problem with the measurement is that initial values of management expenditure are not observed for
some charities. In that case, missing observations are imputed using the average management expenditures
from the observed periods. An alternative way is to estimate the investment rate using the dynamic linear
panel models. Different procedures in constructing managerial capacity have no significant impact on the
results.
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investment can build up a better management team that likely has better abilities and
strategies to raise more donations. Higher investment in office infrastructure and information
technology is good for charities to be more effective in fundraising.
Fundraising productivity represents the unmeasured dynamic impact from the factors,
such as social preference for different charitable causes and a charity’s reputation or good-
will stock accumulated through good development practices. Productivity is known or pre-
dictable to charities and donors when they make decisions related to donations, but it is
unobserved by researchers. Following the literature of productivity (Hopenhayn and Roger-
son, 1993; Olley and Pakes, 1996), fundraising productivity is assumed to follow an exogenous
first order Markov process9:
p(ωjt+1 | {ωjτ}tτ=0, Ijt) = p(ωjt+1 | ωjt) (3.4)
where Ijt is the information set of charity j at time t. This is simultaneously an econometric
assumption on the unobservable and an economic assumption on how charities form their
perceptions on the evolution of their fundraising efficiency. It implies that a charity observes
the realization of ωjt at time t and forms expectations of future ωj by p(ωjt+1 | ωjt).
3.3.3 Charity’s Dynamic Optimization Problem
The events related to a charity’s decision problem unfold as the following.
1. Managerial capacity accumulated until last period kjt−1 is known at the beginning of
t.
2. Government grants gjt are determined exogenously.
3. Efficiency or productivity shock ωjt are realized.
4. Charities make decisions on management mjt and fundraising ejt.
5. Donations djt are determined once the events in 1-4 are realized.
6. Period t+ 1 begins for charity j with managerial capacity kjt.
Government grants gjt are assumed to be pre-fixed before ωjt are realized and charities
make decisions on spending. This is reasonable in the following sense. The procedure of
9The first-order Markov process encompasses the fixed effects when ωjt = ωj .
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getting government grants may take a long time, and before charities get government grants
in hand they might already have information on the success of their application. Government
grants, however, could happen together with or even after ωjt. This could cause identification
problem in our estimation procedure, so I will discuss this problem and the methods to deal
with it in the estimation part.
The charity’s dynamic optimization problem can be characterized by the following Bell-
man equation:
V (kjt−1, gjt, ωjt,∆t) = maxmjt{re(kjt, gjt, ωjt,∆t)− ce(mjt, gjt,∆t)−
βE[V (kjt, gjt+1, ωjt+1,∆t+1)|(kjt−1, gjt, ωjt,∆t)]},
Note that in the payoff function of the current period, re(kjt, gjt, ωjt,∆t) − ce(mjt, gjt,∆t),
fundraising expenses, ejt, are not explicit. The reason is that fundraising expenditure is
assumed to be a variable and non-dynamic input chosen at the time that it gets used. It
has no impact on future payoffs and thus is not a state variable. Hence, the payoff function
is denoted in a form conditional on the optimal static choice of fundraising expenses. ∆t is
used to capture some characteristics related to the charity market such as the macroeconomic
environment or market competition, where t can represent time or region.
The management spending function can be derived by solving the charity’s optimization
problem. Under appropriate assumptions (see a discussion in Pakes (1994)), the optimal
rule for management spending is strictly monotonic in ωjt and can be written as
mjt = f(gjt, kjt−1, ωjt,∆t) = ft(gjt, kjt−1, ωjt). (3.5)
This condition provides the key identification argument in the estimation procedure proposed
by Olley and Pakes (1996). The above formalization is straightforward to extend to a
dynamic model of the charity market.
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3.4 METHODOLOGY
3.4.1 Identification
The major challenge in the estimation of the donation function is the same endogeneity
problem as that in the production function estimation. Donations can be understood as
the value of output, fundraising as labor, managerial capacity as human or physical capi-
tal, government grants as intermediate inputs, and management expenditure as investment.
The endogeneity problem arises from the contemporaneous correlation between fundraising
productivity and other input variables, including fundraising expenditure and managerial
capacity. An OLS procedure that fails to control for the dynamic heterogeneity of fundrais-
ing productivity tends to provide biased estimates. If the inputs are more variable, they are
more highly correlated with productivity and their estimates are more biased (Marschak and
Andrews, 1944; Griliches, 1957).
In the setting with multivariate inputs, there exist different predictions on the signs of
the biases of the OLS estimates. Previous empirical practices generally reach the conclusion
that the estimates on variable inputs, such as labor, is positively biased and the estimates
on invariable inputs, such as capital, are negatively biased (Grilliches and Mairesse, 1998).
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) provides a formal argument for the above claim in the short
panel data when the correlation between variable input and productivity is higher than the
correlation between invariable input and productivity, which is close to the situation of the
donation function.
According to the above arguments, it is expected that the coefficient of fundraising ex-
penditure, the variable input, is positively biased and that on the managerial capacity is neg-
atively biased. Intuitively, fundraising expenditure could be positively related to fundraising
productivity because fundraising is more “profitable” in the case of high fundraising produc-
tivity or positive productivity shocks, so without controlling for the productivity will result
in the over-estimation of the impact from fundrasing expenditure on donations. On the other
hand, there could be negative relation between managerial capacity and fundraising produc-
tivity. This can come from the fact that a charity with better managerial capacity has a
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better chance of surviving lower productivity or negative productivity shocks in fundraising.
Different econometric techniques have been developed to deal with the endogeneity prob-
lem in the production function estimation (Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry and Pakes, 2006). I
employed a procedure based on the two-stage semi-parametric approach developed by Ol-
ley and Pakes (1996) that has advantages over OLS, within, and traditional instrumental
variable estimators (Grilliches and Mairesse, 1998). The identification relies on the rule of
optimal management spending, mjt, which is invertible in fundraising productivity, ωjt, and
can derived from the dynamic model presented in last section. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
provide an alternative justification for this condition. Aguirregabiria (2009) treats this strat-
egy as a control function approach and compares it with other available techniques. More
important, this identification condition is testable.
3.4.2 Estimation
Management expenditure can be written as mjt = f(gjt, kjt−1, ωjt,∆t) = ft(gjt, kjt−1, ωjt),
which implies that, conditional on kjt and gjt, a charity’s choices on management expenditure
incorporate the information of fundraising productivity. Fundrasing productivity can be
inverted as ωjt = h
′
t(kjt−1, gjt,mjt) = ht(kjt, gjt,mjt) and substituted into the production
function,
djt = β0 + βeejt + βkkjt + βggjt + ht(kjt, gjt,mjt) + ξjt. (3.6)
The first stage of the estimation aims to get the consistent estimate of βe by controlling for
the impact of fundraising productivity through a semi-parametric strategy without specifying
the parametric function of management and productivity. The donation function can be
rewritten as:
djt = βeejt + φt(kjt, gjt,mjt) + ξjt, (3.7)
where φjt = β0+βkkjt+βggjt+ωjt. The semi-parametric estimation can generate a consistent
estimate β
′
e and an estimate φ
′
jt of φjt. This stage, however, can not produce consistent
estimates of βg and βk since the non-parametric form of ht, β0, gjt and kjt are incorporated
together as φjt.
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The objective of the second stage estimation is to estimate βg and βk as the following.
First, note that ωjt = E(ωjt | Ijt−1) = E(ωjt | ωjt−1) + ηjt = g(ωjt−1) + ηjt. The second
equality follows from the assumption of the first order Markov process. ηjt is treated as the
innovation component of ωjt from time t− 1 to time t and is unexpected by charities. Then,
one can rewrite the donation function as djt−βeejt = βkkjt+βggjt+E[ωjt | ωjt−1]+ ξjt+ηjt.
Finally, the residual for any given (βg, βk) is computed by:
̂ξjt + ηjt = djt − β̂eejt − βkkjt − βggjt − E[ωjt | ωjt−1], (3.8)
where the estimator β̂e is from the first stage. A consistent approximation to E[ωjt | ωjt−1]
is given by the predicted values from the non-parametric regression based on the computed
productivity index ωjt = φ
′
jt − βkkjt − βggjt for any set of (βk, βg) and φ′jt.
The identification of βk and βg needs at least two instruments which interact with the
residual ̂ξjt + ηjt and form the moment condition. Given that the innovation part ηjt is
uncorrelated with kjt−1 and gjt, so the moments for estimation can be E[ξjt + ηjt | kjt−1] = 0
and E[ξjt+ηjt | gjt] = 0.Over-identification conditions and additional instrumental variables
can be used to improve efficiency and test the specification. Let Zjt denotes all instrumental
variables, the estimators solve
min(βk,βg)
∑
i
[
1
J
1
T
∑
j
∑
t
(̂ξjt + ηjt)Zj,it]2, (3.9)
where i is the index for the elements of Zjt, and J and T are the number of charities and
periods.
The analytic derivation of the covariance of the estimators must account for the sampling
variation in the above two-stage procedure and is difficult to calculate. Instead of deriving
the covariance, this paper employs a bootstrapping procedure to get the standard errors,
as suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). The bootstrapped sample is constructed as
the following. If a charity’s ID number is drawn randomly, all the observations of that
charity will be included. This procedure continues until the total number of observations is
no less than the number in the true sample. The variation from the point estimates of all
bootstrapped samples provides the estimates of the standard errors of the point estimates
from the true sample.
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3.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
3.5.1 Estimation of the Donation Function
Table 3 shows the estimates of the donations function using the procedure documented in
Section 3.2, called base-case, and the estimates from the OLS and the fixed effects model.
All estimations use the same benchmark sample of land conservations. As a first step, I
followed the literature (Andreoni and Payne, 2003) to screen the data.10 The main findings
are not affected by different screening procedures, as shown in the robustness check,.
Table 18: Estimates from the Base-Case, Fixed Effects and OLS
Base-Case Fixed Effects OLS
fundraising expenditure 0.131 (0.036) 0.308 (0.067) 0.305 (0.064)
management capacity 0.927 (0.396) 0.754 (0.128) 0.556 (0.077)
government grants 0.029 (0.019) 0.063 (0.017) 0.025 (0.015)
Note: in all tables, the parameters in prentheses are standard errors.
After controlling for fundraising productivity, the estimated impact of fundraising expen-
diture on donations is significantly reduced by 57 percent, from 0.305 to 0.131, comparing
to OLS estimate. An intuitive explanation is that the OLS estimate of the impact from
fundraising expenditure actually incorporates the impact from the unobserved productivity
in a positive correlation. In other words, a charity is more willing to increase its fundraising
expenditure if its perceived fundraising productivity is higher.
This finding highlights the importance of incorporating fundraising productivity into
the analysis of crowding out. It implies that without controlling the impact of fundraising
productivity might cause the over estimation of the indirect crowding out that is the multi-
10The procedure is the following sequentially: drop 437 observations from charities that have no more
than 3 observations between 1998 and 2003; drop 185 observations from charities never receiving donations;
drop 507 observations from charities never reporting fundraising expenditure; drop 575 observations from
charities never receiving government grants; drop 56 and 178 observations from charities that only report
donations or fundraising in no more than 2 years between 1998 and 2003. Finally, 999 observations remains
from 176 charities.
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plication between the estimated impact from government grants on fundraising expenditure
and the estimated impact from fundraising expenditure on donations.
In the base-case estimation, compared to OLS, the estimated impact from managerial
capacity on donations is increased by 67 percent, from 0.556 to 0.927. Among all the spec-
ification and robustness checks, the impact from managerial capacity on donations is posi-
tive and significant. Table 19 further demonstrates the effects of incorporating managerial
capacity in the analysis by comparing the results from the estimations with and without
managerial capacity. Incorporating managerial capacity reduces the impact of government
grants on donations.
Table 19: Estimates from the Model with and without Managerial Capacity (k)
Base-Case Fixed Effects OLS
fundraising expenditure with k 0.131 (0.036) 0.308 (0.067) 0.305 (0.064)
fundraising expenditure without k 0.128 (0.036) 0.344 (0.069) 0.438 (0.062)
government grants with k 0.029 (0.019) 0.063 (0.017) 0.025 (0.015)
government grants without k 0.038 (0.015) 0.076 (0.017) 0.038 (0.017)
The importance of managerial capacity has important implication on the discussion of
the overhead expenditure of charities. Generally, the public impose high pressure on charities
to reduce overhead spending in management and fundraising, since people think charities
should spend more resources on program services. Charities, however, need to do necessary
investment in management, so that they could build up a sustainable organization in the
long term.
Compared to OLS, the base-case estimate on government grants, gjt, is decrease from
0.029 to 0.025. Such positive impact supports the crowding-in hypothesis (Heutel, 2009).
A robustness check is to use the government grants lagged one period as the instrumental
variables to construct the moment in the second stage; doing this increases the estimate of
government grants from 0.029 to 0.094, but the results are not significant.
The fixed effects model can control for the unobserved characteristics of charities that do
not vary across time. The results from fixed effects model are closer to those from the base-
64
case estimation than OLS, but only controlling the fixed effects is still not sufficient. This
is reasonable since fixed effects model can be treated as a special example of the base-case
model.
3.5.2 Specification Tests
A major concern related to the methodology is whether management expenditure can be
expressed as a function of government grants, managerial capacity, and fundraising produc-
tivity and used to resolve the endogeneity problem.11 One specification test proposed in
Olley and Pakes (1996) is the following. If the proxy of fundraising productivity is condi-
tioning out all of the variation in inputs that is correlated with the productivity shock, the
error term in the donation function, ξjt, should be mean independent of et−1. Moreover,
since et and et−1 are highly correlated, if there were an error in the first stage estimation of
βe, one would expect a significant coefficient for et−1 if it is added to the regression:
djt − βeejt = βkkjt + βggjt + β′eejt−1 + E[ωjt | ωjt−1] + ξjt + ηjt. (3.10)
The results in Table 20 show that lagged fundraising expenditure has no impact on donations
in later periods, so this rules out the possible dynamic impact of fundraising and validates
the identification strategy. Similarly, one can add lagged government grants, gt−1, into the
last step of the estimation to test whether the index restriction in the bias term for the
inversion is consistent with the data. If so, the estimate on gt−1 is not significant, which is
also shown in Table 20.
Another simple check for the identification power of the management spending function,
mjt = ft(gjt, kjt−1, ωjt), is to run the regression of mjt on fundraising productivity, ωjt, after
controlling for the impact from gjt and kjt−1. Here, fundraising productivity is computed
after estimating the donation function as documented in Section 5. The results show a
significant positive relation between managerial expenditure and fundraising productivity.
11Another restriction in the first stage identification is that fundraising expenses chosen in this period
should not be correlated with the innovation in productivity next period. If this is not the case, Ackerberg,
Caves and Frazer (2006) propose an alternative procedure for the estimation. In this paper, if the impacts
from past fundraising are included in the model as another state variable, the estimates of such dynamic
impacts are not significant.
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Table 20: Specification Tests
specification test specification test
of fundraising expenditure of government grants
fundraising expenditure 0.1319 (0.0365) 0.1319 (0.0317)
managerial capacity 1.4082 (0.3683) 1.3408 (0.4223)
government grants 0.0429 (0.0193) 0.0537 (0.0168)
lagged fundraising expenditure 0.0012 (0.0028) -
lagged government grants - -0.0035 (0.0029)
I also conducted two other specification tests within the current empirical framework.
One is incorporating alternative instrumental variables for government grants. The other
is adding more control variables that are typically used in the estimation of the donation
function. In both cases, there are no significant impact on the estimates.
3.5.3 Data Issues
This section focuses on the robustness of the empirical results related to the issues of data
reporting, sample selection, and screening procedure as documented in the data analysis of
Section 2.
There are large amount of observations from charities that never report fundraising ex-
penditure but receive positive donations, which is more likely misreporting because charities
facing pressure in reducing fundraising expenses. To deal with this problem, one approach
I used is substituting those zeros with an imputation procedure. First, I estimate a model
of the determination of fundraising spending, using the observed information such as man-
agerial expenditure, total expenditure and total assets. I assume charities with similar size
in expenditure and total assets should spend similar amounts in fundraising, after control-
ling fixed effects and other observed characteristics. Then I use the estimates from the
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fixed effects model to impute the zero observations by the predicted value of fundraising
expenditure.
The second column in Table 21 shows the results from the estimation using the data that
substitutes the zero fundraising expenditures with imputed values. Compared to the results
without imputation, the salient difference is that the estimate on fundraising is much higher
in the base-case estimation, from 0.13 to 0.32. The reason is that the substitution of zeros
increase the impact of fundraising expenditures. The results have no impacts on the bias
of the estimate on fundraising expenditure which is over estimated and that of managerial
capacity which is under estimated.
Table 21: Estimates after Substituting or Deleting Observations with Zeros
Base-Case Substituting Zero Deleting Zero
Fundraising Expenditure Government Grants
fundraising expenditure 0.131 (0.036) 0.3225 (0.0739) 0.1305 (0.0536)
managerial capacity 0.927 (0.396) 0.9662 (0.4307) 0.9549 (0.2104)
government grants 0.029 (0.019) 0.0296 (0.0202) 0.2911 (0.1296)
The results in the third column of Table 21 are obtained from the estimation without
observations with zeros in government grants. Compared to the estimation that keeps zero
government grants, the estimate of government grants after deleting zeroes is much higher
that is 0.2911 compared to 0.0296 for the base-case estimation. This is intuitive since drop-
ping observations with zero government grants give more weight on the impact of government
grants.
Using the data from other subgroups of green charities generates similar results and
conclusions as those using the bench march sample (land resources conservation). The
results from three other groups are shown in Table 22. The first group is Water Resources,
Wetlands Conservation & Management (C32). The second group includes general natural
resources conservations that can not be categorized into other more specific groups (C30).
The third group includes all natural resources conservations. Overall, the key conclusions
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still hold.
Table 22: Estimates from Different Samples and Data Screening Procedure
Water Other All All Conservations
Conservations Conservations Conservations Different Screening
fundraising expenditure 0.170 (0.050) 0.257 (0.033) 0.173 (0.020) 0.197 (0.012)
managerial capacity 0.947 (0.386) 0.544 (0.103) 0.700 (0.351) 1.718 (0.239)
government grants -0.033(0.035) 0.187 (0.011) 0.016 (0.011) -0.018 (0.012)
For data screening, I try an alternative procedure that I only drop those observations
from the charities that never receive private donations and the charities that have fewer
than 4 observations in the sample period. The results are shown in the last column of Table
22 using the observations from all natural resource conservations. The estimates give the
similar results and conclusions.
3.5.4 Alternative Approaches
Dynamic panel data models (for example, Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000) can also deal with
the problem of the unobserved dynamic heterogeneity in the empirical analysis. Essentially,
such models extend the fixed effects model to allow for more sophisticated error structures by
adding a serially correlated unobservable that follows AR(1) or MA(0) to capture the impact
of productivity. I estimated the donation function using the system GMM estimation from
Blundell and Bond (1998). The estimates from the dynamic panel data model are very close
to the base-case estimates. Such findings are reasonable because of the similar assumptions
of these two approaches, as documented in Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2005).12
12Assuming ωjt follow an AR(1) process: ωjt = ρωjt−1 + ηjt, ωjt is correlated with gjt, kjt and ejt for all
t, and the innovation or changes from ωjt−1 to ωjt is uncorrelated with these variables before t. Thus, the
donation function can be written as djt = βggjt+βkkjt+βeejt+$jt, where $jt = βj+ωjt+ξjt. The estimates
for β and ρ can be derived by the sample analogue of E[($jt−ρ$jt−1)−($jt−1−ρ$jt−2)|{kjτ , ejτ , gjτ}, τ =
1, ..., t− 2].
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Table 23: Estimates from Base-Case and Dynamic Panel Model
Base-Case Dynamic Panel Base-Case Dynamic Panel
without K without K
fundraising expenditure (βe) 0.128 (0.036) 0.158 (0.090) 0.131 (0.036) 0.161 (0.074)
management capacity (βk) - - 0.927 (0.396) 1.010 (0.128)
government grants (βg) 0.038 (0.015) 0.073 (0.017) 0.029 (0.019) 0.040 (0.020)
Instrumental variables are also employed to deal with the endogeneity problem related
to fundraising expenditure and government grants.13 Andreoni and Payne (2009) use total
occupancy costs and total liabilities as instrumental variables for fundraising expenditure
and find that the impact from fundraising is increased, different from the predictions and
results of our base-case estimation. For the instrumental variables for government grants,
Andreoni and Payne use the measures of local politician’s power and find that there are
crowding out effects; Heutel (2009) employs the instruments–social security income transfers
from federal to local or state governments–and find that there are crowding in effects. Both
paper used the data from social service organization. I estimated the donation function
using the same instrumental variables strategy and have similar findings: the estimate of the
impact fundraising expenditure on donations is over-estimated and the impact of government
grants is not significant. The results are shown in Table 24 and Table 25.
13Those instrumental variables have two major problems. First, they cannot resolve the endogeneity prob-
lem related to the unobservable that is time-varying and serially correlated, such as fundraising productivity.
Second, the results are not consistent across different data sets and instrumental variables.
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Table 24: Estimation Using Instrumental Variables for Fundraising Expenditure
Variable OLS FE 2SLS FEIV
fundraising expenditure 0.329 (0.025) 0.314 (0.026) 1.154 (0.237) 0.626 (0.139)
managerial capacity 0.636 (0.056) 0.628 (0.112) -0.106 (0.227) 0.431 (0.149)
government grant 0.031 (0.013) 0.067 (0.014) -0.064 (0.033) 0.046 (0.017)
program revenue -0.060 (0.014) 0.004 (0.022) -0.078 (0.021) -0.018 (0.026)
other revenue -0.069 (0.039) -0.217 (0.051) -0.057 (0.058) -0.152 (0.062)
population -0.067 (0.064) -0.280 (0.664) -0.133 (0.097) -0.564 (0.735)
income/capital 1.925 (0.474) 1.627 (0.862) 1.053 (0.746) -0.873 (1.437)
cons. -16.670 (4.876) -9.051 (12.391) -3.932 (8.074) 20.603 (18.664)
Table 25: Estimation Using Instrumental Variables for Government Grants
Variable OLS FE 2SLS (A&P) 2SLS (Heutel)
government grant 0.031 (0.013) 0.067 (0.014) -0.095 (0.060) 0.023 (0.082)
fundraising expenditure 0.329 (0.025) 0.314 (0.026) 0.382 (0.035) 0.333 (0.042)
managerial capacity 0.636 (0.056) 0.628 (0.112) 0.677 (0.062) 0.639 (0.062)
program revenue -0.060 (0.014) 0.004 (0.022) -0.052 (0.015) -0.060 (0.015)
other revenue -0.069 (0.039) -0.217 (0.051) -0.079 (0.041) -0.070 (0.039)
population -0.067 (0.064) -0.280 (0.664) -0.070 (0.067) -0.067 (0.064)
income/capital 1.925 (0.474) 1.627 (0.862) 1.961 (0.498) 1.927 (0.475)
cons. -16.670 (4.876) -9.051 (12.391) -17.010 (5.122) -16.692 (4.882)
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3.6 DETERMINANTS OF DONATIONS
3.6.1 Interpretation and Decomposition
The estimated parameters of the donation function are elasticities so the marginal impact
from fundraising expenditure, managerial capacity, and government grants on donations can
be computed by multiplying their estimates with the inverse of their ratios to donation:
β̂e ∗ (d/e), β̂k ∗ (d/k), and β̂g ∗ (d/g). Using the base-case estimates and the median ratios,
the marginal impact of fundraising expenditure, managerial capacity, and government grants
are respectively 2.16, 1.08, and 0.10. For managerial capacity, it means that one dollar
of marginal spending on management capacity leads to 1.08 dollar increase in donations.
Fundraising expenditure remains the most important determinant of donations, followed by
managerial capacity and government grants.
After estimating the donation function, donations can be decomposed into the con-
tribution from fundraising productivity, fundraising expenditure, managerial capacity, and
government grants, as shown in Table 26. Fundraising productivity is computed by wjt =
djt − β̂e ∗ ejt − β̂k ∗ kjt − β̂g ∗ gjt.14 The decomposition shows that fundraising productivity
is a key determinant of donations and its variance is much higher than other determinants.
Government policies should account for charities’ differences in fundraising efficiency and the
causes of such differences. For example, the matching grants policy may not be effective if
the fundraising productivity of a grant recipient is very low. Furthermore, the causes of low
fundraising productivity may not be related to bad performance because not all charitable
causes are well recognized by society at the beginning.
3.6.2 Fundraising Efficiency
In this subsection, I investigate the determinants of fundraising efficiency using the computed
fundraising productivity and compare it with the commonly used measure of fundraising
efficiency–the ratio between donations and fundraising expenditure. The analysis is con-
14An alternative way to compute the fundraising productivity is using Wjt = exp(djt−β̂e∗ejt). Fundraising
productivity is a relative efficiency measure since its absolute value depends on the different ways to measure
it. The robust checks show that different relative measures have no impact on the following analysis.
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Table 26: Decomposition of the Donation Function in the Log-Linear Form
donation productivity fundraising (β̂e·e) management (β̂k·k) grant (β̂g·g)
mean 12.2 -.62 1.14 11.5 .203
s.d. 2.78 2.24 .441 1.57 .166
median 12.4 -.403 1.24 11.5 .276
ducted based on the following regression:
wjt = βj + β
pexpejt + β
asxasjt + β
prxprjt + β
orxorjt + µjt (3.11)
where wjt is the measure of fundraising efficiency, βj is the fixed effect. Other explanatory
variables are four ratios: program service expenditure over total expenditure xpejt , total assets
over total expenditure xasjt , program service revenue over total revenue x
pr
jt , and other revenue
over total revenue xorjt . The control variables include age and expenditure variables.
It is expected that fundraising efficiency is positively determined by the asset scale rel-
ative to total expenditure and the ratio of program service expenditure in total expendi-
ture, because the relatively high asset and program service provision indicate good charities.
Fundraising efficiency should be negatively related to the ratios of program service revenue
and other revenues in total revenue, since if charities have other revenue resources they might
not have strong incentives to improve their fundraising efficiency, considering that their main
objective is not to maximize their total revenue but to provide public services.
Table 27 shows the estimates from the fixed effects model. In the first column, the
efficiency measure is the computed fundraising productivity incorporating the impact of
managerial capacity. It can be seen that the coefficients have the expected signs. In this
case, managerial capacity as an explanatory variable has strong predictive power. These
results are robust to alternative computation of fundraising productivity. For instance, the
results are similar if using the productivity measure without incorporating the impact of
managerial capacity, as shown in column 3.
72
Table 27: Determinants and Comparison of Fundraising Efficiency
Variable Fundraising Fundraising Donation/
Productivity 1 Productivity 2 Fundraising
managerial capacity 0.516 (0.076) - -
age 0.031 (0.034) 0.017 (0.032) 11.3 (25.4)
(program expenditure)/(total expenditure) 5.365 (0.773) 5.326 (0.761) 983 (842)
(total asset)/(total expenditure) 0.013 (0.003) 0.013 (0.002) -15.1 (20.5)
(program revenue)/(total revenue) -2.155 (0.965) -2.364 (0.960) -280 (157)
(other revenue)/(total revenue) -0.154 (0.137) -0.162 (0.138) 1.40 (14.2)
Intercept -0.187 (0.769) -4.747 (0.778) -209 (661)
Note: The estimates are obtained from the estimation of the fixed effects models. Fundraising productivity 1
incorporates the impact of managerial capacity, but fundraising productivity 2 does not.
In the last column of Table 27, the results are obtained using the alternative measure of
fundraising efficiency–the donation-fundraising ratio. It shows that only some parameters
have the expected signs and most of them are not significant, which implies that the donation-
fundraising ratio as a measure of efficiency may be problematic.
3.7 CONCLUSIONS
I incorporate managerial capacity and fundraising productivity into the analysis of dona-
tions to charitable organizations and demonstrate that both have important impact on the
estimation of the donation function. More works can be done by applying this productivity
approach to study whether and why there are differences in fundraising efficiency across
different groups of charities. Policy design should also account for charities’ differences in
fundraising productivity.
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This paper provides the evidence that supports necessary managerial investment, how-
ever, the public might impose too much pressure on charities to reduce their overhead ex-
penditures in management. It seems interesting to further investigate the micro-structure
and compensation scheme of charities, as well as their relation to charities’ performance.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 ANONYMOUS DONATIONS
The number of donors listed as anonymous does not constitute a large percentage for any
charity as shown in Table 28. The number of anonymous givers for the Pittsburgh Opera is
the largest, but 87 of the 105 listed anonymously give between $120 and $249 which is the
lowest tier.
A.2 PRIVATE BENEFITS
The next two tables report the bundles of private benefits received in each tier for those
organizations that actively use these benefits.
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Table 28: Anonymous Donors
# of Anonymous Donors % of Donors
Ballet 10 1.76%
Carnegie Museums 4 0.32%
Children’s Museum 7 3.65%
City Theater 6 3.41%
Opera 105 15.89%
Phipps Conservatory 2 0.20%
Public Theater 66 5.75%
Symphony 34 4.84%
WPC 5 0.24%
Zoo 4 0.61%
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Table 29: Perks of Different Charity-Ties: Part 1
Charity-Tie Giving Dinner Ticket Event Gift Autograph Parking
Ballet: Pointe Club 100 0 0 1 2 0 0
Master’s Club 250 0 0 2 2 0 0
Choreographer’s Club 500 0 0 3 2 0 0
Principal’s Circle 1000 1 1 3 3 1 0
Artistic Director’s Circle 2500 2 3 3 3 1 0
Chairman’s Circle 5000 2 3 3 3 1 0
Carnegie museum: 500 0 3 3 1 0 0
1000 0 4 4 1 0 0
1895 Society 2000 1 5 4 2 0 0
Curator’s Society 2500 1 6 4 2 0 0
Director’s Society 5000 3 6 4 2 0 0
President’s Society 10000 5 7 4 3 0 1
Carnegie Founder’s Society 25000 5 7 5 3 0 1
Symphony: Symphony Club 500 0 0 5 3 0 0
Encore Club 1000 0 2 5 3 0 0
Ambassador’s Circle 2500 0 3 6 3 0 1
Director’s Circle 5000 0 3 7 3 0 1
7500 0 3 7 3 0 1
Guarantor’s Circle 10000 1 4 7 3 0 1
Chairman’s Circle 15000 1 4 7 3 1 1
20000 1 4 7 3 1 1
Founder’s Circle 25000 1 4 7 3 1 1
50000 1 4 7 3 1 1
City Theater: Dressing Room 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
Green Room 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
Backstage 250 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wings 500 0 0 0 0 0 0
Center Stage 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Play Circle 2500 2 2 0 0 1 1
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Table 30: Perks of Different Charity-Ties: Part 2
Charity-Tie Giving Dinner Ticket Event Gift Autograph Parking
WPC: Contributing 100 0 1 0 2 0 0
Patron 250 0 1 0 2 0 0
Benefactor 500 0 1 0 2 0 0
Leadership Circle 1000 0 3 0 2 0 0
2500 0 3 0 2 0 0
5000 0 3 0 2 0 0
7500 0 3 0 2 0 0
10000 0 3 0 2 0 0
20000 0 3 0 2 0 0
Opera: Friend 150 0 1 1 0 0 0
Sponsor 250 0 1 3 0 0 0
Patron 500 0 2 5 1 0 0
Benefactor 1000 0 2 6 1 0 0
3000 2 3 6 1 0 1
5000 2 3 6 1 0 1
10000 2 3 6 1 0 1
25000 2 3 6 1 0 1
Galaxy 50000 2 3 6 1 0 1
Phipps: 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
Contributing Membership 100 0 2 1 3 0 0
Supporting Membership 150 0 2 1 4 0 0
Sustaining Membership 250 0 3 1 4 0 0
Benefactor Membership 500 0 3 1 5 0 0
Henry Phipps Associate 1000 1 3 1 5 0 0
2000 1 3 1 5 0 0
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